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THE CAUSE AND EPPECT OP BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS
The causes of business depressions are engaging the
thought of men today more theua at euiy other time during our
generation. Depressions appear to be one of the by-products
of our system of government, of our business methods, and of
our unbalanced civilization, A remedy for devastating depress-
ions is being searched for TR?ith as much diligence as Ponce de
Leon's exploration for the "Fountain of Youth"*
Periods of depression are testing times for business
and financial institutions, for governments and their citizens,
and even for our rigid laws. Every depression seems to have
certain fundamental elements, such as: over production, over
expansion, speculation, unsound financial practices, all of
which tend to aggravate the seriousness of the situation.
Our government was organized in 1789, and because of
the resulting added incentive to business, we did not exper-
ience our first depression until the year 1819. This panic,
as it is usually called by historians, was of minor signif-
icance in comparison with other depressions which were to
follow. It was due for the most part to the abnormal growth
of industries as a result of the restrictions placed by our
government on imports from European countries, directly follow-
ing the American Revolution and also the War of 1812.
This depression could be termed primarily a finsm-
cial orgy. Bad banking, speculation, 6uid the people's gen-
eral ignorance of the principles of finance brought their in-
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evitable toll of unemployment, falling prices, and reduced
manufaoturers
•
At this point, it might be well to define what ia
meant by a depression. Depression is defined in a business
sense as "^"a state of dulness, or inactivity; a protracted
season when business falls below the normal". This definition
covers depressions in general; a more limited definition of a
business or industrial depression would be: "a state of
dulness or inactivity in the industries of the country; a pro-
tracted season during which the production of buildings, fur-
niture, goods, machinery, railroads, ships, automobiles, etc.,
* falls below the normal".
^"A panic or crisis is usually sbort, sharp, and de-
cisive in its results. A depression is a condition which has
duration of time attending it."
Another very important distinction should be made
4
between depression and poverty. "It should be distinctly
noticed that depression is not the same as poverty, although
the two may appeetr contemporaneously. Just as depression
describes a condition of greater duration than a crisis, so
poverty applies to a condition more prolonged than a depress-
ion, and one which is essentially permanent. Depression runs
its course and disappears. Poverty remains. The study of
1. Standard Dictionary.
2. Hull, Geo. E., INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, 1911, P. 19.
3. Wright, Carroll D. , REPORT ON IvlDDERN INDUSTRIAL "DEPRESSIONS,
1886, P. 15.
4. Burton, Theodore E. , CRISES AND DEPRESSIONS, 1926, P.12.
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periods of depression reveals the fact that there are alter-
nate seasons of activity and dulnesa in trade and industry,
tVLt that these alternate seasons do not, in a series of years,
prevent an increase of prosperity. Poverty describes a per-
manent loss or abatement of prosperity. Progressive and high-
ly developed countries suffer from depression; unprogressiv©
fiuad decayed countries suffer from poverty."
WHAT IS PROSPERITY
Of course, the other side of the situation would be
the business condition called prosperity. I'he transition from
depression to prosperity reminds one of the law of action and
reaction which is, ^"To every action there is always opposed
an equfiuL reaction." Prosperity is a slow, gradual period of
evolution from the depths of despair to the plateau of good
2business. '^Ihe increased confidence in business prosperity
gathers momentum with rapidity. The new enterprises in the
field are able to compete v;ith old established firms only
because of the era of high prices. Capital is rapidly be-
coming scarce and there is much credit tension. Commodity
prices by this time have reached high levels. Stocks prices,
however, have already started to fall* Any event may dislodge
the economic structure from its false position of security.
Many banks are in a weakened position because they have ex-
tended loans on the basis of inflated vsLLues."
1. Newton, Sir laaSkC, IIATHEHATICAL PHIIICIPALS 0? NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY, 2nd iidition, P. 15.
£. White, Percival, BUDSETIIIG Ii; BUSINESS T.IAI?A5EJ!EJTT
,
1926, P. 59,
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The aiimmation of all the preceding factors leads to
the following definition of prosperity: ^"Prosperity ia that
interval of super-normal business beginning with the month
in which the index recovers to 100 and ending with the month
preceding a persistant recession to sub-normal business."
BUSINESS NORl'i^LCY
The business cycle theory has four main groups,
namely: the decline, the depression, the recovery, and finally
prospecrity. Normalcy of business conditions comes just before
the decline on the downward movement of the business cycle,
and just before recovering on the upward movement of the cycle,
A study of the long range trend of business conditions leads
one to draw the conclusion that business conditions never re-
main normal, that is to say, at exactly 100 for any great
length of time. When the state of business hovers around, or
very close to, the 100 point, it is sufficient to say that
business is normal .
It must be remembered, however, that this so-called
100 figure must be adjusted not only for seasonal variations,
but also for the growth of the country or nation under consid-
eration.
If business should theoretically stay at exactly
100 for any protracted period, the fundamentals of economics
and also the desire for personal gain would soon eliminate
such a Utopia.
1. Persons, Warren M. , FORECASTING BUSINESS CYCLES, 1931,
P. 197.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS
Sinoe the early business history of this ooiintry,
ipe have experienced nine major depressions. Some have lasted
only a year, v?hile others have extended into as many as six
years. Ever since the first major depression, namely in 1837,
economists, historians, and business men have been attempting
to eliminate the causes and effects of business depressions.
Seemingly the remedies instituted to help us out of the pre-
vious depression have sometimes become the problems of the sub-
sequent depression. History seems to repeat itself unfailing-
ly. The economic significance is even more pronounced. This
consideration involves, not only one country, but the entire
group of countries. "^"It has frequently been stated that
crises and depressions manifest themselves only in a highly
civilized state of society, where commerce and industry flour-
ish and there is enterprise and spirit. Also, that until with-
in a comparatively short time they have not been recognized
except in England, France, Belgium, the United States, Holland,
and the Scandinavian countries, while more recently they have
appeared in Austria, Grermany, and Russia. It is no doubt true
that crises occur where credit and enterprise are found.
Nations which do not experience these visitations are not on
that account to be congratulated, for their absence indicates
a permnent state of stagnation. On the other hand, nations
much less advanced than those mentioned have felt the influ-
1. Burton, Theodore E. , FIN-^NCIIL CRISES AND PERIODS OF
lEDUSTRIAL AND COLMEHCIAL DEPP.ESSION, 1926, P. 36.

enoe of these disturbances. 'In 1873 and the succeeding years,
the date of the most wide-soread and representative of all
crises, Brcizil, the Argentine Republic, and Peru, all exoer-
ienoed the distress which arises from falling prices, de-
ficiency of employment, and the results of previons overaction.
The disturbances in each of these countries follov!ed an in-
crease of trade relations vith more advanced communities and
large exoenditures for public and nrivate v>orks. British Con-
sular Reports of th-^t time fully portray the situation there.
,The results \!»ere much the same as in more advanced nations,
with a tendency to increased severity because of the absence
of a diversity of resources. If the symotoms were less pro-
nounced or the sufferings less acute, it was because the in-
dustrial organism was less complicated. A study of conditions
in the Argentine Republic in 1890 affords one of the most val-
uable object lessons upon the subject of crises.
^"It would thus seem that crises are incident to a
state of progress cxnd exoansion rather than dependent upon the
degree of advancement."
"A depression seems to fall upon mankind out of a
clear sky. It scorns to choose a moment when the earth is im-
poverished. For, in times of depression, is the soil less
fertile? Hot at all. Does it lack rain? Not at all. Are
the mines exhausted? No; they can perhaps pour out even more
than the old volume of ore, if anyone will buy. Are the fac-
tories, then, lamed in some way--down at heel? No
;
machinery
1. Burton, Theodore E., CRISES M^D DEPRESSIONS, 1926, ?.37.
2. Pisher, Irving, BOlI^S AND DEPRESSIONS, 1932, "^.5.

and invention may be at the very peak. But perhaps the men
have suddenly beoome unable or unwilling to work. The idea
is belied by the spectacle of hoards of workmen, besieging
every available employment office.
"Perhaps, then, the world has beoome overpopulated.
But how could that happen in so short a time? When the
calamity starts there seems to be enough of every good thing to
go around; everybody wants it, and nearly everybody wants it
enough to work for it; yet some cannot get it, and many who
oan get some of it must be content with less." This is the
social significance of the problem.
PURPOSE OF THE 3TUDY
There are three main purposes of this study, ^'irst,
to determine the causes of depressions. Second, to determine
the effects of depressions. Finally, to arrive at various
methods of attacking these depressions.
There have been innumerable causes given for bus-
iness depressions. For example, one of the nineteenth century
depressions was explained thus: ^"The one and only cause of
the existing economic disturbance was overspending, over-
consuming, destroying more wealth than is reproduced and its
necessary conseouency, poverty." This theory seemed reason-
able and satisfied a great many economists for a time, but
the awkward feature about claiming this theory is that de-
pressions for a hundred years have always followed periods
which reflect the greatest increase in wealth. Furthermore,
1. Price, Bonamy, THE CONTEMPORARY REVIE7/, April 1877.
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each depression seems to be more severe in countries which
have made the greatest progress in wealth, and not in those
which have made the most progress towards poverty.
Each depression brings out a new crop of alleged
causes, each one reasonable enough to satisfy at least a
portion of the population, euid of course enough of them in
number to satisfy almost every one for a time. But the en-
tire population have never been satisfied by any single one
of the alleged causes, and as the mystery has deepened with each
generation, so the interest in its solution has increased.
As years have passed, many of the learned and scien-
tific men of different nations have made an effort to solve
the mystery. Thus, you might say that the number of alleged
causes has been greatly increased. Howev^, each depression
has at least several old causes, and perhaps only one new
one; so that, fundamentally speaking, the last nine depress-
ions have brought out most of the major causes.
The determination of the effects of a depression
are far reaching. New methods, new economics, new inventions,
new processes, new laws, and many other changes are brought
about from the lessons learned in the last depression.
The methods of attacking depressions may be summar-
ized under three main headings: 1, l«Iatural course; 2, Scien-
tific method, and 3, G-overnmental control.
As soon as the first effects of a depression are
felt, a great cry arisen.; for artificial business stimulants.

Much propoganda for vast public works programs are broadcast,
"buy-now" programs are launched, and other means are used to
inject into f€LLling business the necessary strength to turn
the tide. Many economists argue that these methods or sugges-
tions only delay the depression from running its course for a
short period of time. They say with a great deal of boldness
that we must have a depression every so often, and unfortunate
ly the schedule calls for it now. Yihy waste time, money, and
effort in order to stem the downward tide? Let the depression
take its natural course, artificial stimulants work only for
a time, and eventually may cause conditions to be much worse.
So they say, with a great deal of resignation, let the depress
ion take its natural course. This is the negative way of
fighting business depressions.
Another school of thought, somewhat more modern,
claims that there is a scientific way of battling the great
plague called business depressions. Its principal methods of
attack lie in the control of the fundamentals of economics.
Let us exert control over production, commodities, employment,
money and such like, and the depression will be of short
duration. Control over these important factors is based on
certain formulas and standards which they have devised over a
period of years. This last depression which we have just
passed through has been one in which the scientific method of
attack was very popular. This school feels that if you let
the depression run its natural course, it might lead to a
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national catastrophe much more severe than if it had been oon-
trolled.
An even more stringent method of attack is that of
governmental control. This is even more far-reaching than
the scientific method. The government steps in and practically
runs business. Emergency legislation is passed which some-
times becomes permanent law much to the disgust of the busi-
ness man. The money and the monetary system is changed at will,
and almost over night tremendous profits are made by some, and
severe losses are sustained by others. GrovernmentsLl assistance
in combating the depression is of great aid, providing it is
of a technical nature and is not too political.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OP BUSINESS DEPRESSIOliS
The depression of 1819 as previously stated was the
first depression experienced by the recently organized govern-
ment of the United States. Although at the time it seemed
rather disastrous, subsequent depressions made this one seem
very small. Therefore, as a basis for the historical examples
contained in this study, the first one to be considered is the
depression of 1837. This depression and eight others consti-
tute the major depressions. However, in addition, there were
six other minor depressions worthy of consideration.
Depression of 1837
^The panic of 1837 was one of the most disastrous this
nation has ever experienced. It was the consummation of
numerous events that extended back over a number of years. It
1. McG^rane, Reginald, TliE PAN EC 0? 1837, 1924, P.l.
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marked the close of one period in our industrial history, and
the beginning of a ne^^' era. It was all-inclusive both as to
the population and also as to all phases of our economic life.
It required exactly seven long years to master this oppression,
xbe. chief revelation was the weakness within our financial or-
ganization, resulting in the collapse of the Bank of the United
States in 1832, This bank failure laid the foundation for the
crisis of 1837. Immediately the Second Bank of the United
States was organized, but was refused a charter by the govern-
ment. Leading bankers at that time then organized under a
state charter,
^"By the spring of 1836 the country had apparently
forgotten its past disorders. Not only was the United States
out of debt, but, largely through this amazing sale of the
public domain, she was piling up a surplus in her treasury.
The value in property in New York was higher than it had been
for five years, business was brisk, and the city assumed a
new aspect."
2
"The quantity of public lands sold in 1835 was
three times the amount of 1834."
This land sneculation called forth an elaborate
credit system which expanded greatly sjnong individuals and
states. On July 11, 1836, came the Specie Circular. The
Democrats claimed this Oircuiar had been issued to stop the
1. McGrane, Reginald, THE PAIIIC 0? 1837, 1924, P. 5.
2. Exec. Doc, Twenty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., Doc. 80.
LAUD OFFICE REPORT. January, 1838.
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farther monopolizing of the public land for speonlation. Their
opponents, the Whiga, naturally found entirely different reasons,
all of a oondemnable nature. They asserted that its intent was
to reduce the surplus; that it enabled land speculators to sell
their land speedily at a handsome profit, so that they might be
able to refund the money they had borrowed from the pet banks;
and that it aided the brokers, acting as agents for some of
the officers of the government, to realize fortunes for them-
selves and their employees by speculating in certificates of
deposit signed by the United States treasurer, and transfer-
able in whole or in part to land purchasers. Furthermore,
western farmers would be compelled to buy their lands from Hew
York speculators at a large advance.
Whatever doubt existed in the minds of the people
concerning the motives for the Specie Circular, it had very
definite results. The treasury order, by withdrav,ing specie
from the east, and carrying it far into the interior, nat-
urally crippled the financial facilities of the large eastern
cities, and eventually led to a general contraction through-
out the nation. Hoarding of specie became very popular, and
caused it almost to disappear from circulation.
At this time the jj'ederal Government was practically
out of debt, and United States funds were to be placed in
nsany banks. This condition natursLLly brought a flood of new
banks into existence with the hope of getting government funds
for deposit . Between 1830 and 1836, 347 nev.' banks were
chartered, of which 249 of these were in the East. The estab-
1. LIcOrane, Reginald, THE PAlIiC 0? 1837, 1924, P. 13.
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lished banks overextendeoL loans "because th e.y exoected to re-
ceive large government funds. "^Debt due to banks increased
from $28,000,000 in 1830 to |56,000,000 in 1837 v»hiah repre-
sented an increase of 100 percent in only seven years. Currency
in circulation increased even a greater oercentage from
^59,000,000 to ^140,000,000.
Within six years the value of real estate rose over
150 per cent in rie\^ York City. Overtrading, snecilat ion , and
investment in unproductive undertakings became a dominant note
in American society.
The chief method of attacking this deoression vr-ds
final co-operation between the banks of the nation and of
the j^ederal Government. The ban.is of the country, especially
thjse located in Bev^ York City, out forth a strenuous effort
2
for the resumption of Specie payments. "The apoeal, never-
theless, v»ent unheeded. So long as the government tipheld the
enforcement of the Specie Circular, which forbade the receipt
of anything but gold and silver at the land offices; so long
as the administration pressed forward its plans for a Sub-
treasury; and so long as the Legislature of Pennsylvania did
not fix a time for resumption, there was no need to be
'"rushed into resumr^tion" ' merely to satisfy New York. Any
premature action would olace the United States Bark at the
mercy of the government. If the latter t»"rew treasury notes
on the market after the Bank had agreed to make its oaymect
1. McGrane, Reginald, TEE PANIC OH' 1837, 1924, P. 13.
2. Hull, (Jeorge H., INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSILUS, 1911, P. 144.
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in speoie, the Bank's own depositors would exhaust the supply
of gold and silver in its vaults in purchasing these notes.
It was much wiser, therefore, to remain on the defensive."
President VanBuren is credited with one of the most
important steps toward restoring the Grovernraent ' s credit
through his Sub-Treasury scheme in 1840. It restricted pay-
ments to or by the government to gold or silver coin which was
a leading contribution to the rebuilding of confidence and
business prosperity.
After the panic of 1837, gold and silver coin used,
of course, as a metallic base of "hard money" brouj^ht back
public confidence and business prosperity.
The Three Years' Depression from 1846 to 1848
Business conditions commenced to revive to a consid-
erable extent in 1844, but did not gain full headway, as they
were checked by a sudden and enormous advance in prices in the
spring of 1845. "^"During the next eighteen months, prices
declined steadily. By August 1846 they had settled back near-
ly to the low level of two years before."
The Mexican War broke out in May, 1846, and peace
was declared on ii'ebruary 2, 1848. This war was very short and
sharp, and it therefore caused no serious financial depression,
and the debt created was met withoiit difficulty. "The ex-
penditures of the war department during the three years April
1. Hull, George H., INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, 1911, P.144.
2. Dewey, Davis Rich, i'lKANClAL HISTORY OP THE UITITED STATES.
1909. P. 255.
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1, 1846, to April 1, 1849, were ^80, 845, 116, as comoared
with ^£1,991,183 in the three previous years; and the ex-
penditures of the navy department for the period April 1,
1846, to October 1, 1848, were ^18, 758,900, as compared
with 14,007,281 for the two and a half years before the war.
These sums, making a total excess of ^63, 605, 621, were met by
loans in the form of treasury notes and government stock."
European trouble during this same period also added
to our difficulties. This depression was one of great sever-
ity; however, no financial disturbance of sufficient inten-
sity, such as a panic, occurred. The public today hardly re-
members this depression, simply because it was not accentu-
ated by a panic. The method of attack was comparatively
simple. Prices of commodities were very low, and of course
this condition had a tendency to increase the number of con-
tracts for construction and general building purposes. Rail-
road construction also encouraged by low cost was very large.
All these factors led to a great period of industrial prosper-
ity culminating in the latter part of 1857. Although this
sustained period of prosperity was temporarily halted during
the last half of 1854, the tide soon turned again to last un -
til the middle of 1857.
The Panic of 1857.
The United States during the preceding years had
been a very rapidly developing nation as far as business went,
but at the same time a financially weak one as compared with
f »
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European oountries. Many of the new ba^nks which opened dur-
ing this period were of a speculative and unreliable nature.
5hirthermore , a great deal of capital was absorbed in the con-
struction of canals and railroads, especially in 1866, Con-
siderable national development was also made along other lines.
This, of course, called for a steadily increasing and finally
excessive amount of loans, an increase in a much faster pro-
portion than the amounts of new bank deposits. One especially
bad defect during this period was the inability of the banks
to restrain in any manner or to check capital expenditures
for unwarranted expansion of business.
The rates of discount rose rapidly and money became
very scarce. Stock exchange securities declined, and the
market became demoralized. H'he transaction of business be-
came difficult, causing contraction to set in. This, of course,
was accompanied by many bank failures due to inadequate and
inefficient banking facilities. This condition resulted in
loss of confidence which immediately precipitated a collapse.
The failure of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company on august 24, 1857, marked the beginning ofthe crisis,
although the actual panic was postponed until October 13, 1857,
The immediate effects of these perilous conditions were hoard-
ing by banks and individuals, and runs on banks, which caused
the banks to refuse to redeem their notes in specie. Bank
notes therefore were sold at a discount. Interest rates rose
to 25 per cent and later to 100 per cent, causing a drying up
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of all new security issues. Railroads temporarily suspended
interest payments on their bonds and oommodity prices fell
from 10 to 36 per cent.
The aotusLL duration of this crisis was between three
and four months, and ended when the banks resumed Specie pay-
ments in December, 1857.
i'his depression was exceedingly sharp, yet it was
short lived; real recovery set in izmnediately , stimulated by
the bright agricultural outlook and the inflation of the Civil
War period which soon began.
Natural causes were the primary reasons that brought
the country out of this depression. There was no special method
of attack. Even though it was readily apparent that our
currency and banking conditions needed revision, Congress took
no steps to remedy this situation. The depression of 1857
taught the disastrous effects of wild soeoulation, such as
that which took place with the influx of new metal into the
currency following the California gold rush.
The Short Depression of 1861-1862
This depression occurred just before, or at the start
of, the Civil Ytfar. Previous to this, namely, on December 20,
1860, the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession was announced;
and on February 4, 1861, the Southern Confederacy was formed.
About the middle of 1861, the public debt of the United States
was $74,985,000, of which about ^18,000,000 had been incurred
Since the beginning of the secession movement. The available
fujhds in the treasury amounted to only $1,716,000, and until
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Congress could assemble for the purpose of passing nen legis-
lation, the only way of providing funds was by the sale of
bonds. Grovernment credit at this time was at a low ebb, and
Thus the bonds had to be sold at a discount; even so, only a
few million were sold.
"^"When Congress met in special session, July 4, 1861,
Chase was ready to propose financial measures on a more com-
prehensive scale. He estimated that the sum needed for the
next year would not fall far short of ;^320,000,000
"To provide for the ordinary expenditures, for the
interest on the public debt to be created, and for a sinking
fund to extinguish the debt. Chase recommended that |80,000,000
be raised by taxation; the extraordinary expenses were to be
met by loans
"On the proposed loan of ^240,000,000 Chase suggested
a high rate of interest, 7-3 per cent, on short-term treasury
notes, or 7 per cent, on long-term bonds, to be sold at not
less than par; for immediate needs he favored an issue of
treasury notes in smaller denominations bearing a lower rate
of interest."
It did not take Congress long to accept these plguis,
and they finally voted to impower the secretary to borrow
$250,000,000 in three-year 7,3 per cent treasury notes, or in
twenty-yesu" bonds not exceeding 7 per cent.
2
"In view of the difficulties encountered by the
1. Dewey, Davis Rich, FINANCIAL HISTORY 0? THE UNITED STATES,
1909, pp. 276-277.
2. Dewey, Davis Kich, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1909, P. 278
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treasuxy department in placing small loans during the pre-
vious winter of 1860-1861 this operation might well seem hope-
less; but three changes in conditions had occurred which af-
fected the disposition of capitalists with funds to invest.
In the first place a definite policy had been adopted; loan
and tax bills had gone hand in hand; and, in the light avail-
able to the most acute political observers of the time, ample
provision had been made for the demands of a contest which
it was confidently believed would be over in a fevr months.
Secondly, a more liberal rate of interest was authoriaed, which
tended to attract capital deprived by political disturbance of
its ordinary commercial use. Thirdly, the spirit of loyalty
was being aroused to the recognition of the need of financial
as well as military support of the government; business men
more intelligently realized the dependence of commercial inter-
ests on the stability of the government. Thus it was possible
in one operation to borrow and transfer from the people to the
government more wealth than had as yet ever stood as the
principal of the public debt."
Naturally the banks of the country had to absorb
most of this government financing, and since the banks had
limited capital in the first place, it restricted further
loans for business enterprises.
^"The northern banks in general were able to main-
tain specie payment until the latter part of December, 1861,
when they were forced to suspend, followed almost immediately
1. Faulkner, Harold Underwood, A?.ffiRICAlT ECONOMC HISTORY.
1924, P. 381.
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by the federal government. In the south, outside of Kev;
Orleans, suspension occurred immediately after the opening of
the war and continued until the end. The wild-oat banks in
the west were especially hard hit, not only because of their
methods of banking, but also because of their more intimate
relations with the south. In Illinois, out of 110 banks, 89
failed, while in Vifisconsin 39 and in Indiana 27 went under."
Civil V/ar activity was the main power that overcame
this depression. It is true that thousands of farmers enlisted
in the Union Array, and thousands more deserted agriculture
for the mines of the far west; however, they were replaced by
the work of women in the fields, by the influx of immigrants
from Europe, and also by the use of labor-saving machinery.
Kot only agriculture enjoyed marked prosperity due to the
necessity of feeding an army which numbered almost a million
men, and also an ever increasing population of the country as
a whole; but also manufacturing in the north received a marked
prosperity. This stimulation of manufacturing was attributed
to the needs of the War, and also to the liberal protection
afforded by the recently passed Tariff Acts. The country ex-
perienced during this period, the greatest prosperity in its
history until th« year 1865.
The Depression of 1865-1866
The Civil War left the southern states in a de-
plorable condition. ^"Everywhere demoralization, confusion,
and destruction seemed to abound. The war had lasted four
1. Harlow, ivalph Volney, THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES,
1925, P. 531.
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years, with the greater part of the fighting in the 3outh»
bringing terrific waste and loss. The whole political, social,
and economic system had collapsed; the very fabric of Southern
civilization seemed to be torn into shreda. There was no or-
ganized government, because v,hen the Confederacy went to pieces,
the states fell at the same time. The only functions of gov-
ernment and administration that were carried on at all were
those in charge of federal troops. Property had been destroyed
on every hand: farm buildings
,
shops, railroads—both track
and rolling stock. The labor system to which the South was
accustomed had disappeared. Most of the comparatively meager
supply of accmmilated capital in the South had been sunk in
worthless paper currency and equally valueless bonds. The
two or three billion dollars invested in slaves of course was
charged off with the advent of emancipation."
This severe deflation, of course, had psycholog-
ical effect upon the North, but only for a short length of
time. Soon manufacturing was revived, and the replacement of
the many items lost during the war was started.
The southern states' demand for goods along with the
increased demand in the I^orth soon brought the country out of
this short depression. ^"The Southern States, instead of send-
ing their raw cotton to the north, or to Europe, began to man-
ufacture it in increasing quantities, and now competed with
northern mills for the markets of the Mississippi Valley. The
1. Day, Olive, A HISTORY 0? COMJ.tERCE, 1923, P. 562.
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development of iron production in the South was phenomenally
rapid, i'he rich coal and iron fields of the Southern Apped-
achian range v/ere opened and contributed nov, an important
share of the total output, while large industrial centers were
growing up in Chattanooga, Birmingham, and other Southern
cities.
"
This system of spreading the manufacturing estab-
lishments over the dense settled portions of the United States,
and also the increased efficiency of our agricultural sections
enabled the country to enjoy almost eight years of prosperity
and general industrial expansion.
Long International Depression of the Seventies
A study of the antecedent conditions leading up to
this international depression is well viorth an ajialysis. Rail-
road construction all over the world vras on a scale previously
unknown, the first transcontinental railroad being completed
in this country in 1869. Industrial and other construction
work also was at a new high level. Great progress had been
made in the development of our natural resources along with
many new uses made of our raw material. An enormous increase
in manufacturing and agricultural activity and output involv-
ing colossal absorption of capital was reflected. National
credit of our government and also business organizations was
high, but our monetary system was imperfect, and our currency
somewhat inflated.
National banks were created chiefly to insure a
market for government bonds, through bond-secured national
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bank notes which they issued. The government became more close-
ly identified with the nation's banking affairs, but Congress
did not provide the necessary legislation to enable the banks
to check over- expansion with a corresponding over-strain of
credit. Along with the great prosperity there was a steady
expansion of loans and a scale of living and personal expen-
ditures never before seen in the United States.
The initial steps leading up to the crisis were as
follows; high interest rates for the preceding tvjo years along
with extremely Ioy: bank reserves against deposits; wide and
irregular fluctuations in security prices; panicky conditions
on the stock exchange; and enormous amount of railroad secur-
ities placed on the market which embarrassed underwriting and
banking institutions endeavoring to float them. On September
18, 1873, the crisis was ushered into the United States by the
failure of Jay Cooke and Company.
This Company was the country's leading brokerage firm,
and at that time was engaged in building the Northern Pacific
Railway. Thus, the collapse of railroad speculation was
started.
While this depression was due chiefly to over-devel-
opment in America, its birthplace was in Germany, and thus
it spread to the entire world. Its immediate effects were
very serious. Bank deposits were withdrawn with great rapid-
ity. No loans, not even upon the presentation of good collat-
eral, were obtainable. IJuch money disappeared from circula-

tion, legal tender notes were at a three per cent premium,
and gold notes at a six per cent premium. Not only were bank
failures in the majority, but there were also nine failures
in every one thousand commercial houses. The New York stock
exchange was closed for ten days, and the suspension of Pay-
ments lasted for forty days.
Depressions of this kind affected the entire indus-
trial set-up. No business organization, regardless of its size,
was exempt. Even commodities dropped twenty per cent, and
many ?;ere unsaleable. The crisis lasted about three months.
Recovery began on the stock exchange around November 13, 1873,
but the refill business recovery did not set in until 1879, the
year of resumption of Specie payments.
The greatest factor contributing to the Panic of
1873 was the unsound financing of the Civil War through the
issuance of "green backs" as currency, and it took some years
to outlive the results. The usual distress caused by this in-
flation was experienced by wage earners, salaried people, and
all with fixed income.
European crop failure aided us to a great extent in
combatting this depression. This helped us to increase our
foreign trade to ^?1 ,278,762,000 in 1879, B^lrther aid in the
elimination of this depression was the increase in new con-
struction of railroads to 4,746 miles and the increase in iron
production to 2,742,000 tons. Bank clearings increased to
139,000,000,000.
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"In fact, the entire year f/itnessed an improvement
so marked that at the end of the twelve months, mills were in
fall operation, all labor was employed, and the entire coontry
was in a very prosperous condition." Congress provided, as a
result of this depression, a safe, but inelastic currency
secured by bonds. I'his depression will be remembered as one
in which we had a depreciated currency. As soon as the situa-
tion was rectified, namely in 1879, as was previously stated,
recovery set in and prosperity was restored.
Depression of 1884 to 1886.
Another period of international depression was con-
fronted during the years 1884 to 1885. This one was due pri-
marily to the preceding great and rapid expansion of the West,
<ind also to the enormous railroad construction. Prior to this
time, earnings of the railroads had been very large due to
the profits derived from the hauling of their own supplies for
cof.struction. However, these unusually large earnings de-
clined as the roads approached completion. Llany corporations
paid out large stock dividends to their stockholders, and also
brought out new issues of securities which caused tremendous
inflation.
This depression was primarily an industrial deoress-
ion only, as we did not suffer to any degree financially. The
inflated condition of things in 1881 needed only the severe
shock of the assassination of President Sarfield to throw the
1. Babson, xvoger W.. BUSINESS BIBOHBTEBS, 1929, P.176
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ooantry into a decline. The oountry rallied, hov.ever, from
this disaster, Jay Gould making his famous exhibit of secur-
ities in 1882 in the vain effort to stay the panic. ^"As vjill
be seen by referring to the newspapers of that day, it was
clearly understood by students of conditions that a distinct
decline had begun, and Grould probably knew this as well as any
man. xherefore, although he was preaching that the conditions
were perfectly sound and that still greater prosperity was
ahead, he himself was doubtless unloading and liquidating with
all possible speed in oreparalion for the public withdrawal of
his support later. Moreover, the beuaks were aiding their di-
rectors by keeping down money rates although the demand for
money was very great. Students of fundamental statistics, how-
ever,, oould not be misled, and knoving that the area of over-
expansion was rapidly being consumed, prepared for trouble."
In the beginning of 1884 Henry villard failed and
was soon followed by the failure of James Keene, the IJarine
Bank, the Metropolitan Bank, and the House of Grant and V<ard.
This last failure was disheartening as General Grant was the
8
idol of the nation. "Kew construction declined to 3,973
miles, and iron production was reduced to about 500,000 tons.
Bank clearings decreased to !1^44 ,000 ,000 ,000. Failures rose to
10,968 in number, with $226,000,000 of liabilities. Immigration
also declined to 500,000 in number On the stock market,
artificial support being removed from money conditions, stock
1. Babson, Roger W., BUSINESS BAROMETERS, 1929, P. 180.
2. Babson, Roger W., BUSIIIESS BAH0:ffiTERS, 1929, P. 182.
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prices fell r<ipidly. Stock sold at 113 in j'ebruary, and 86
in the winter months. Uet railroad earnings declined to
;|^2,318 per mile."
The crisis was of short durations* Stock market prices
reached their low point in the fall of 1884, and increased in
1885 considerably, iiowever, a strong agricultural crop helped
out this situation. J'inal recovery wi^e made during 1886, and
by 1887 prosperity was again in full swing.
The defeat of the various bills vhich were introduced
into Congress for the reduction of the tariff caused a special
increase of confidence among manufacturers, wholesalers, and
bankers. This, perhaps, v;as the one thing that turned the tide,
although money rates also remaining normal greatly encouraged
nev, enterprises. The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
in 1887 was a further boom to business and inaugurated the pol-
icy of government-controlled railroads, thus doing away v.itb
the worst of the railroad speculation era.
The Depression of 1893-1898
This period of depression did nut witness any destruc-
tive wars. However, many highly speculative enterprises were
launched, calling for vast quantities of bank credit. Many
great railway and industrial projects were launched by England
in her colonies, and in such regions as South Africa, and
South iimerica.
In the United States, while the decade prior to 1893
saw many railroad receiverships, there was much competitive
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railroad building and absorption, and extension of smaller
lines by larger systems.
The initial stages of the panic vibioh reached its
crucial stage in 1893, and which continued until 189$, was the
failure of Baring Brothers. "^"The sensational collapse of the
greatest banking house in England produced serious apprehen-
sion in the United States, which soon began to take form.
"So far-reaching in its effects was the Baring fail-
ure that it precipitated liquidation of merchandise and se-
curities throughout the world. Immediately following the
announcement, great quantities of American securities were
dumped on the American market. The pressure to sell upon a
declining market and the withdrawal of loaned funds so un-
settled confidence that in November, 1890, there developed a
money panic on the New York Stock Exchange which one day forced
the rate for money to 186 per cent."
This time the currency troubles were due to the ex-
tensive coinage of silver. The ratio adopted of 16-1 greatly
overvalued the cheaper metal, driving out gold emd bringing in
artificial rise in prices.
All these troubles, plus the failure of the English
banking house of Baring Brothers, led to the withdrawal of
much English capital, and also contributed to the export of
gold, large amounts of which were probably hoarded. In all of
our history up to that point, the gold reserve had never dropped
to such a low point.
1. Price, Walter W., WE HAVE RECOVERED BEFORE, 1933, P. 67.
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N evert h el ess , the West and South experienced an
enormous expansion in bank loans. The orice of securities on
the Nev York Stock Exchange declined thirty to fifty per cent.
The early part of the summer of 1893 brought on a sudden con-
traction of loans, followed by the failure of the Reading Hail-
way and National Cordage Company. The beginning of the crisis
was actually on July 25, 1893, when the Erie Railroad failed,
and the Milwaukee Banks suspended payment,
•^"During the first aix months of 1893 failures
numbered 8,100, and for the entire year there were about 15,300
failures, with liabilities of over ^350,000,000, Gold brought
a premium of 4 per cent. No industry escaped the blight of
severe depression. The low prices of farm commodities were
calamitous, but, to make matters worse, farmers suffered also
from serious crop failures. Distress was acute. Hunger and
want were widespread."
All of this culminated in the repeal by Congress of
the Silver Purchase Law on October 30, 1893. The acute stage
of the crisis covered about forty days, and ended early in
September. After the political campaign of 1896, the Grold
Standard Act of 1900 was passed. Emergence from the depress-
ion was greatl^v aided by a succession of good haivests and
the discovery of gold in Alaska. Conditions became so favor-
able that American manufacturers began to invade foreign
markets. Gold as a single standard of currency brought the
country out of the depression of 1893, although its influence
1. Price, Walter W., WE HAVE RECOVERED BEFORE, 1933, P. 77.
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was not completely felt until the Grold Standard Aot of 1900.
The Panic of 1901
The panic of 1901 dav;ned upon the country after a
Tery extraordinary period of prosperity and speculation, and
was precipitated by the efforts of t^wo contending factions
for the control of the Eorthern Pacific Railway. The market
price of this stock rose from iji^lOO per share to ^1,000. Shorts
finally were permitted to settle at ^160 per share, but for
a time during the day a good part of Wall Street was technically
insolvent.
The year 1901 was one of the most eventful in our
country's history, Hotable occurrences included the already
mentioned stock market corner, the complete failure of the
corn crop with ensuing high prices, lowered yields on all
other crops excepting wheat, and the break in Amalgamated
Copper over failure to hold the price of copper at 17 cents
in December with the collapse of the copper market,
A good many mergers were planned and these along
with the good support afforded by the sound banks soon brought
the country into a period of general prosperity.
The Depression of 1903-1904
The panic of 1903, which carried over into the year
1904, was marked by three important factors, namely, the de-
cline of the steel business to a low ebb with the resulting or-
ganization of the syndicate which underwrote the new bond issue
of United States Steel Company, the collapse of the shipbuilding
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trust, and the puncturing of over-capitalized and un-digested
security issues.
This movement terminated in 1904, the first impetus
coming with the decision in March of the Northern Securities
case. Hot only was confidence reflected in a great demand for
good bonds, but also a substantial rise was experienced on the
Stock Exchange. In manufacturing and trading lines, business
was poor during the early months, but a decided improvement
took place in the last five months of the year.
Depression of 1907-1908
At this time the credit conditions among the larger
nations of the world were not in very good shape; in fact they
were favorable to a crisis. Furthermore, business was pro-
gressing at such a fast pace that the credit resources of the
country were unable to supply the needs. Interest rates con-
tinued to rise and security price trends were downward. The
increased cost of commodities and labor finally offset the
great percentage of business profits.
The crisis was inaugurated by runs on many banking
institutions and the suspension of the Knickerbocker Trust
Company. Next a run; developed upon the Trust Company of
America, which in intensity and duration has hardly been ex-
ceeded in any similar instance in the City of New York.
"^"Through the leadership of Mr. Morgan, who assumed
control at once, the Trust Company of America was saved. Al-
1. Price, Walter W., WE HAVE RECOVERED BEFORE, 193;5, P. 93.
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though this panic was one of the most acute of its kind, it
was not of long duration, and within a comparatively short
time, as a result of the forceful direction of Mr. Morgan,
the gravity of the situation and the danger that threatened
the entire politic were brought to an end by a complete res-
toration of confidence."
The major result of this depression was the forma-
tion of the National Monetary Commission whose investigations
ultimately resulted in the F.ederal Reserve Act,
Anti-Trust Scares and the Depression of 1911
Politics and government interference, which proved
so disturbing to business in 1910, continued to sap the con-
fidence of business men in 1911. Particularly in the railroad
and industrial world were these factors upsetting. In the rail-
road field, the absolute refusal of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to grant higher rates worked an undue harsh ip even
on the well situated roads. Their refusal proved both sur-
prising and disappointing and caused great retrenchment. Of
course this was instantly felt in the heavy industries such as
iron and steel and also in all equipment lines.
The federal authorities likewise initiated many new
trust prosecutions and hinted that there was to be no end to
such litigation. Apprehension was made all the more acute by
reason of the fact that in May the Supreme Court confirmed the
dissolution of the Standard Oil Company and the American To-
bacco Company. Agricultural crop yields were low because of
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the drought and prices vere high, thus advancing the cost of
living.
-the financial markets did not experience any great
difficulties and, contrary to vhat might have been exoected,
the stock market closed the year at approximately its opening
levels.
Business recovered from this minor depression early
in 1912 in spite of the government's continued litigation
against large business organizations. The method of attack
during this short depression was rather negative, in that sii.oe
business had been abnormal, the lav» of supoly and demand would
naturally call for an increase in business.
The Depression of 1914
The general wave of rirosperity created by the expan-
sion of the credit basis, the vast corporate mergers, the
opening of new markets abroad, and the expanded relationship
with the rest of the world culminated in the degression of 1914,
^"By far the greatest event in this year was the be-
ginning of the Great European War. The decline of 1915 quick-
ly developed into depression. Several enormous failures
occurred in June and July, including the Glaflin catastrophe.
:^hi3 liquidation seemed to clear the air. There were many in-
dica-tions that an improvement in business would come with the
bountiful fall harvests. Such was the situation when on August
1 the iiuropean War burst upon the world, bringing panic to the
1. Babson, lioger W., BUSINESS BAHuMETERS, 1929, P. 219.

-34-
financial circles, the closing of exchanges, and the stagna-
tion to business. As "business v;as well liquidated, no ser-
ious national catastrophe occurred, and matters soon began to
adjust themselves to the new situation."
If the World ¥/ar had not come just at this time, it
is probable that the reaction of 1914-15 would have proved one
of our most important turning points. The war alone brought
the country out of the depression and made possible many of
the developments in our national life that are now so familiar.
The War itself stimulated prices and energized industrial ac-
tivity. The War was also the signal for the government to
drop the anti-trust agitation. Furthermore, the eastern rail-
roads were allowed to increase their freight rates.
This crisis emphasized the need of massing reserves
and credit expansion such as the Federal Reserve System pro-
vided.
The Depression of the Early Twenties
The period preceding the crisis in 1920 was marked
by the greatest expansion which has ever occurred in the United
States. Industrial capacity increased 30 fo. This great ac-
tivity of course was no doubt stimulated by the War. As a
result of the War, the United States turned from a debtor nation
to the role of creditor and assumed the position of foremost
power in the world. The banking center was no longer in London
but in the largest city in the world, New lork City.
^"The panic which began on November 12, 1919, v.as
1. Price, Walter W.. WE HAVE RECCVERE]) BEPOKE, 1933, P. 93.
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preceded by very high money rates, by evidenoe of great un-
easiness, by demands on the part of the banks for the cur-
tailment of over-extended loans, and by a collapse of commodity
prices
This collapse of the commodity prices accentuated the
depression. During the first part of 1920, business in general
continued at high speed. Unsatisfactory transportation condi-
tions caused merchants to duplicate their orders, thus in-
creasing the demand. The result naturally led to an accumula-
tion of large stocks of goods piled up in this country and the
slackening of the iiuropean demand. Living costs went up until
consumers were unable to pay the high prices demanded. The
inevitable reaction took place with a sudden break in commodity
prices. Just a few examples are noteworthy; wheat dropped from
$2.75 to |1.70; and corn declined #1.02 per bushel to $.68.
After this reaction a wave of contract cancellation threatened
the very structure of business morale.
Through the operation of the now well established
Federal xieserve System a much more orderly readjustment took
place. The System not only made it possible for temporarily
embarrassed concerns to receive help but also afforded inter-
district accommodation.
Business remained below normal for about two years
but wcis finally artificially helped by favorable legislation.
The oassage of the xtural Credit Act and the extension of the
War ij'inance Corporation were tremendous aids. Another import-
ant change was the revision in the eligibility require-nents of
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the Federal Reserve System, enabling the banks to extend and
provide a greater amount of credit to a much larger business
structure.
This depression was one of the vjorst for the rail-
roads. More mileage was abandoned than built, aoci_uisitlon of
new equipment fell to a new low point, declines in freight and
passenger business were the greatest ever known, and the net
return earned the smallest since 1894, Most of the period msiny
of the railroads struggled to keep out of bankruotcy.
Early in 1922 there was a marked change for the better
in all the factors that had previously helped to paint such a
black picture. The depression was finally conquered by revival
in building operations, a pronounced pick ud in the automobile
trade, the placing of large equipment orders by the railroads,
and the subsequent increase in the iron and steel output.
Although this revival was hindered to a certain ex-
tent by labor troubles, finally settled during the middle part
of 1922; the stock market saw continually rising prices which
were influenced more by an investment demand than by the spec-
ulative element. Led by the great building boom and later by
the public utility boom the country recovered and entered the
greatest period of prosperity in its history.
The Depression of 1930-33
^"That the present world economic crisis is more uni-
versal and more severe than any hitherto experienced in modern
times is beyond reasonable question. The distress of business
1. iirendtz, Hermann P., TEE WaY U'JT 0? DEP?.ESSICi:. 1931, ?.l.
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enterprisers is shown in the high rate of bankniptoiea pre-
vailing in the leading countries of the ao-oalled 'capital-
istic' world, the distress of agriculture is reflected in
forty- five cent wheat at Chicago, farm foreclosures and a
steady run of bank failures in agricultural regions. Seven-
cent copper and thirty-cent silver reflect woe of the mining
industry; while many millions or unemployed all over the world
testify to the near breakdown of the ordinary economic oper-
ations through which the needs of the world's people are accus-
tomed to be supplied."
The real decline in business began in the first part
of September, 1929, and was accentuated by the Hatry failure in
London. ^''The first spectacular evidence that America was in
for a depression was the crash of the New York Stock Market."
'^"During 1928 the federal Reserve Board tried to
check the speculating fever by gradual advances of the re-dis-
oount rate, half of one percent at a time, from 5%- per cent to
6; in vain. On August 8, 1929, the rate was advanced more
drastically from 5 to 6. This caused an ominous but temporary
drop in the market; there was a quick recovery, and not till
September 7 did the market reach its peak."
On September 26 the Bank of England's discount rate
was increased to the very high figure of 6^ per cent. This
action of the Bank of i^ngland produced a flurry of selling in
the New York Stock Exchange. Right then a retired Ne^ York
1. Wisher. Irving, THE STOCK MARKET CRASH AND AFTER, 1930.
2. i'isher, Irving, BOO LIS AIID DEPRESSIuNS. 1932, P. 86.
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broker said, -^"This marks the end of the Nev; Era IduII market?"
September 29 msirked the beginning of the panic. On
October 24 jjearly 13 million shares were traded and it was the
most sensational day of trading that the Nev York Stock Exchange
has ever seen. But not for long, for only a few days later,
on October 29th, nearly 16^ million shares chaiiged hands. Then
came the third and last spectacular day—iJJovember 13, 1929.
Ihe FederauL Reserve System exerted all of its power to prevent
this great avalanche. It ourohased securities in the open mar-
ket in an effort to check falling prices, and it even cut the
re-discount rate on the 14th, but slLI of these factors were,
at the most, temporary pauses on the tremendous do?,'nward land-
slide.
2
"Between the loans on the stock market and the stock
market price level there could not be a better example of a
vicious spiral. V/ith every distress liquidation the price level
fell; and every fall of the price level drove a new set of
people into further liquidation, which still further lowered
the price level, which compelled still further liquidation, and
8 0 on and on."
The course of industry and trade in 1930 was almost
persistently downward, with the brief exception of the open-
ing two months, when the Spirit of optimism arrested deflation
temporarily. This was due, for the most part, to a series of
economic conferences in which leaders promised not to cut wages
or restrict production. This move on the part of President
1* Hickernell, Warren P., WHAT I.IAKE3 STOCK MA.RKET- PRICES?
1.932 P 173.
2. ii'isher ,' Irving, BUOLB DEPRESSIONS, 1932, P. 91.
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Hoover later proved to make oonditions worse.
Iron and steel showed a continuous monthly decline
with the sharpest decrease in December, Demand was limited
and subsequent price-cutting resulted in utter collapse,
A sweeping downward revision in stock prices, exten-
sion of the reduction in brokers' loans from a peak of
^8,549,000,000 to <^1 ,894,000,000, and margin trading reduced
to low levels made 1930 an outstanding year on the Stock Exchange.
The year 1931 was one of intense business depression
from the very beginning to the very end, with activity dwind-
ling each successive month and pessimism rampant. Security
prices depreciated daily and commodity prices sank lower and
lower, Ner financing was at a ridiculously low level, unem-
ployment reached 8,000,000, and the whole situation was made
worse by the dark outlook of the international situation. A
million fewer automobiles were produced than in 1930 and three
million fewer than in 1929. Building suffered a severe slump,
which in turn depressed the very important lumber business and
industry. The railroads suffered terrible losses and many
were obliged to reduce and suspend dividends. Some went into
receivership, such as the Florida East Coast Railroad and the
Wabash Hailroad.
In Europe affairs turned for the worse, just at the
time the United States was reaching the low point of the de-
pression. In June when President Hoover secured an internation-
al agreement to a moratorium on reparations and war debts, tem-
porary relief cnrae. The month of September was very important
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in that ^reat Britain, after exhausting two large Prench-
American credits, found it necessary to suspend the gold stand-
ard, a move which wag soon followed by all the Scandinavian
countries
•
The stock market was completely demoralized and orices
melted av»ay as never before. Stocks used in the Dow-Jones
averages declined 62% from the high of the year, making the
downward movement the most extensive in the history of the aver-
ages. Bonds also suffered as severely as stocks.
The year 1932 did not bring any relief from the ex-
isting chaos. In fact, business declined to nev; low levels.
In the midst of a demoralized stock and bond market in Ivlay,
1932, several industries decided to close up shop almost en-
tirely, with the result that coal mining, the textile industry,
the steel industry, and hundreds of other small industries were
operated for the United States as a whole, at perhaps not more
than 25 per cent of capacity.
The building industry, usually one of great dependa-
bility, had suffered one continuous slump. Great efforts were
made to revive this part of business through vast public works
programs which proved ineffective because that branch was
only a small part of the total. The average for the building
industry was around 25 per osnt of the 1923-1929 levels.
In June security liquidation dried up, a bond invest-
ment pool was formed under the auspicies of iJew York banks,
headed by J . P. Morgan & Co., and a sharp upward movement
ensued in both bonds and stocks. This soon became a terrific
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aurge and reasbed a volume of trading oliniax in the mddle of
SepteiEber at levels averaging 100 per cent above the June
figures. In some cases, stocks i»ere up 700 or 800 per cent,
but as a nhole the levels of the spring before the decline
Here not reached.
Business started upvard for one 3K)nth, but liciiidation
of bank loans contir.ued zo s-ash an eztent to cause eno^ign
pressure on business to stop this upward move. ConEioditj pric«B,
after advancing sharply?, rene"v;ed their decline.
The month of October witnessed the turn of the polit-
ical tide with the state of Maine going i>emocratic. This marked
the beginning of the great Campaign to be launched on the De::*-
ocratic side on a plank of more outspoken and radical proinises
than the country had heard in its history, -hese were era-
bodied in the three words, "xhe Hem Deal". The Republican plat-
form was based primarily on a "Stand Pat" attitude, taking for
granted the gre-tness cf President Eoover. Both of these phil-
osophies were expressed by nation-vide political advertising
eampalgns. However, with very little advertising. President
Hoosevelt carried all but six states.
The banking situation grew fr^m baa to worse. "?be
first major shoci: occurred October 51, when the Lieutenant"
Sovernor of Hevala declared a banking holiday for twelve days
because of the difficulties of twelve banjis with abc/ut
^17,000,000 of deposits, controlled by ieorge Wingfield. Ib«
effect on the State of fievada of the closing of twelve banks
1. Bogen. Julies I
.
, TEE BAirZi::^ C3I3IS, 1333, P.134.
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out of a total of twenty-five can easily be imagined. The state-
ment of the Lieutenant-Governor in declaring the banking holiday
contained the following ominous sentence: 'The situation has at
last been reached where the conditions can no longer be met by
ordinary banking methods without reorganization. It hais be-
come necessary to call upon the public to understamd the problem
and to unite in the plan to save it.'"
Ihis moratorium in the State of Nevada was the first
of many to follow. Jor a time, many believed that this would
be only an isolated instance, and that the banks in the other
states would be able to ride out the storm without invoking ex-
traordinary measures. This hope proved to be false. The stock
market reached a nev/ low point in July, but closed the year at
somewhat higher levels.
^'*The financial structure of the country was face to
face with an apparent collapse. Vivid stories of what had
happened during the (Jerraan and i'rench inflations, with their
resultant widespread ruin and misery, occupied the thoughts of
the American middle class, which began to think in terms of
inflation."
The year 1935 was ushered in with a certain degree
of enthusiasm; at least the people were encouraged by the fact
that in a few munths the noble experiment called "The New Deal"
was to start. But the intervening months proved very disas-
trous to iimerican business and especially to our American bank-
ing system. The lead taken by the State of Nevada late in 1932,
in declaring a moratorium on the banks of the State, w^-s followed
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in February by the State of Louisiana. ^"The sense of secur-
ity of the large commercial banks in the East, based on their
extraordinary liquidity, was suddenly jarred by the news that
the State of Michigan on February 14, 193J, had declared a
banking holiday until February 21, 1923. The time for clown-
ish gestures, for finding an excuse for bank holidays, viaa
gone. Governor V*'illiam A. Comstock of Michigan declared frank-
ly that, in view of the acute financial emergency existing in
the City of Detroit and throughout the State of Michigan, he
deemed it necessary in the public interests and, upon the re-
quest of the Michigan Bankers * Association and the Detroit
Clearing House Association, to declare a state holiday. With
one stroke of the pen the bank deposits of the State of Michigan,
amounting to approximately $1,500,000,000 and involving about
550 banks, were tied up. The financial resources of one of the
greatest industrial states of the Union thus became frozen
over night."
The closing of the Michigan banks marked the begin-
ning of the final crash. March 4th, the Inauguration Day,
was celebrated to the tune of a national edict closing all the
banks of the nation. Withdrawals on loans from insurance com-
panies were forbidden. Plans to issue script, and a multi-
tude of other proposals in the next few days had to be weighed
by the new Administration. Money in circulation had increased
over 50 per cent in three weeks, due to a great extent by un-
warranted hoarding on the part of a great many short-sighted
1, Bogen, Jules I., TEE BANXIIIS CRISIS, 1933, P. 142.
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people. Others understood this to be the extraordinary cli-
max of a oash craze in contrast with the security craze and
installment and credit craze of 1929, They, of course, log-
ically bought securities and their confidence has since been
amply rewarded.
lo those whose concept of national finance and the
monetary system was vague, the uncertainties of those few days
led to some nervousness. After nine days the majority of the
banks were opened for all business purposes except the payment
of gold. In the midst of this whirlpool of destruction, the
relief in the hearts of the masses, at having an Administra-
tion in which they could have a new confidence, was apparent
at the opening of the banks, for there were absolutely no runs
whatsoever, and as a matter of fact, total deposits were much
greater than withdrawsuLs.
Business was at a standstill, the building industry
having even dropped to about 10 per cent of its boom-time
\evels. The Stock Exchange was also at a stand-still, being
closed for two weeks. However, when it re-opened, prices ad-
vanced to as much as 100 per cent in some issues. During the
moratorium, the nation had gone from cash crazy to prooerty
crazy, but the lack of sufficient cash with which to carry
on the exchange of stocks and business resulted in a mild re-
cession in prices which, however, did not last long, because
weekly statistics on business activity were beginning to climb
rapidly. An embargo was then declared on gold exports, and
it was not long before the dollar was quoted at a discount in
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foreign markets; thus ended, temporarily at least, the gold
standard. The nature of the gold standard was at last under-
stood. Creditors accepting billions upon billions of bonds
payable in gold knew that the supply did not exist for the
simultaneoua oayment on demand in gold.
The previously mentioned developments and the rapid-
ity with wbioh Congress in special session passed campaign
platform legislation, the unanimity of spirit, and the over-
whelming support given the President, resulted in the sharpest
advances ever experienced in the history of the New York Stock
Exchange. Conservative investor, speculator, and gambler had
one purpose,— to buy common stocks for the protection of pur-
ohasing power and as a hedge against inflation,
i?rom this memorable date in history, namely March 4th,
1933, until the end of 1933, more legislation was passed apr)li3-
able to business than in any other year in our history. The in-
flationary legislation program was passed by Congress along
with radical farmer bounties for curtailment of agricultural
output. Hew tax laws were aimed at the holders of wealth, re-
strictive laws were directed at our banking system, and neF
security issue laws dried up the majority of new financing.
l"The administration believes the country is much better off to
keep the money in J.Iain Street rather than have it go to VYall
Street. Hence, notwithstanding the justified complaints of the
investment bankers, the President believes that more good than
harm is being done by the New Securities Act. He believes that
1. Babson, Roger W. , WASHINGTON AHD TEE REVOLUTIONISTS, 1934,
P. 10.
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the legislation ia in the interest of the underdog."
The National Industrial Recovery Act was also passed
through Congress without much difficulty. This led to the
sharpest revival of business activity and employment ever ex-
perienced in the Nation; the textile industry, for example,
which had been depressed for years, was operating at almost
100 per cent capacity. Part of this increase was due to an-
ticipated higher wages under the codes, a large portion to
actual orders on hand, a certain degree to transfer of liquid
wealth into commodity wealth, and the balance to an increase in
business confidence.
This New Deal legislation called for vast expendi-
tures, and the national debt in three years increased by
$6,000,000,000. The total national debt at the end of the 1933
fiscal year was approxi-iat ely ^22,539,000,000.
Many other important events took place during 1933,
such as the International Monetary and Economic Conference in
London; the passage of processing taxes on various commodities;
initial purchase of gold by the Government; abolishment of
Child Labor; governmental, attempts at depreciating the dollar
in order to raise commodity prices; a public epidemic of rate
reductions aimed at the public utilities; resumption of diplo-
matic relations with Russia; and the repeal of the Prohibition
Amendment. All these factors in addition to many others enabled
business to close the year at about 25 per cent above the low
levels arrived at in March; and about 20 per cent above the
beginning of the year levels.
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The year 1933 inarkecL the turning point in the great-
est depression ever experienced in our modern civilization.
Practically every known method of attacking a depression i^faa
used. Perhaps the greatest effort put forth was by the admin-
istration under the leadership of our so-called dictator. Pres-
ident Roosevelt. In no other depression of the past have college
professors played such a prominent part in gathering, analyzing,
and disseminating statistics. These professors, in addition
to their statistical work, have been called by President Roose-
velt "the brain trust", and as such have given him much valu-
able assistance and aid in combating the tremendous problems
which confront a president in such a period of chaos.
Perhaps the greatest single method of attack was the
threat of, or the actual use of, inflation. Of course infla-
tion naturally means an increase in the prices of goods and
oominodities which eventually means an increase in the purchas-
ing power. "^"Of course, business moves ahead when nev: purchas-
ing power is put into action. (Do not overlook the fact that
the mere buying of commodities as many have done to protect
themselves against inflation does not by itself increase busi-
ness.) New purchasing power comes into effect suid business
moves forward when those in charge of such operations see gain
in the action. When is there likely to be a gain? Certainly
not if selling prices will be lower than costs—and again cer-
tainly not if selling prices, though higher, were to be in
money which threatened to become worthless soon, ^lany people
1. Babson, Roger W., WASHINGTON AND THE REVOLUTION IS?*5 , 1934,
P. 312.
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in discussing inflation overlook this latter aspect of the sub-
ject, i'hey are not aware that beyond a certain point, which
may be impossible to determine, there would be a tendency for
business to stop entirely and to hoard the available supply of
goods ii. warehouses and in process. In such a case inflation
would destroy its present objective." So far inflation has not
been carried to a disastrous extent.
The other pronounced method of attack was the exer-
tion of governmental control of business. ^"A final effort
to save the capitalistic system— a move tov;ard a ne% economic
systeiTi— a form of state socialism—an ominous extension of bureau-
cratic control of industry— a guarantee of social justice—
a
plain partnership between Government and business--these are
merely a few of the descriptive terms leveled at the National
Industrial Recovery Act." It is no doubt true that as for the
partnership between government and business, some phase of it
is written in almost every line of the new legislation. So far
the National Industrial Recovery Act has meant a great deal,
not only to the American business man, but also to the wa^e
earner. Business under this act certainly has been better than
at any ti ae during the entire depression.
2
"In America, where heretofore unadulterated individ-
ualism has been the unchallenged faith of the whole people, vre
have seen the government undertaking far-reaching plans of
financial regeneration; elaborate economic schemes for the re-
1. Valenstein, Lawrence, BUS I : ESS UNDER THE RECeVEHY ACT. 1933,
P. 20.
2. Angell, Sir Norman, ?ROM CHAOS TO COrTHOL, 1933, P. 140.

lief of the farmer; and shortly we shall see States embark-
ing upon unemployment insuranoe, the while the Federal Gov-
ernment is brought nearer to international planning by a less
trammeled participation in the V/orld Economic Conference."
In summary, the depression has been fought along
twelve definite lines:
"Special interest must be sacrificed to gener-
al interests. This is the basic principle of the revolution
in connection with the redistribution of income.
2. "The adoption of a system of economic planning in
the interests of the entire country.
3. "Protection of the credit of the federal govern-
ment by a policy of economy and the balancing of the budget.
4. "Balancing farm and industrial prices and get-
ting the prices of raw materials back to the 1926-28 level.
6. "Inaugurating the large public vjorks orogram and
other features to create employment.
6. "Entering into the ovvuership and operation of
great public works such as Muscle Shoals, Columbia Hiver, St.
Lawrence development. Boulder Dam and the Mississippi River in
the interests of undeveloped sections and handicapped people.
7. "Protecting the people's savings by strengthen-
ing the banking situation and safeguarding the issuance and
sale of securities.
8. "Coordinating the transportation systems to elim-
inate waste and increase efficiency, the purpose being both to
1. Babson, noger W.. WASHIIlGTuK AND THE REVOLUTION ISTS . 1934.
P. 320.
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reduce rates and to protect investors.
9. "Take a vigorous part in world affairs on the
theory that one nation cannot prosper in the long run unless
other nations prosper likevjise,
10. "Reduce vjorking hours, both to spread employment
and to create more leisure for spiritual and cultural develoD-
ment •
11. "Protect legitimate debtors from losing their
homes and farms by the creation of the i'arm Credit Administra-
tion and the Home Loan Corporation.
12. "Embark upon federal relief to assure every
worthy person who is able to work a position, and those who
are not able to work, aid."
REGULARITY OF BUSIITESS DEPRESSIONS
A study of the major and minor depressions since the
original organization of our government leads one to draw the
Cunclusion that there is no definite number of years elapsing
between the various depressions. Some were seven years apart,
while others occurred after a lause of only tvo years; in
some cases, especially minor depressions, only a year separated
the depression.
Law of Action and Reaction
One interesting fact from a study of past depressions
is, that they are always followed by a period of prosperity of
about the same degree of intensity or volume as that of the ore-
vious deoression. i'or example, the nation enjoyed a marked
-05-
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period of prosperity from 1916 through most of 1920, or five
years; vvhereas the offsetting depression lasted only tvo years,
but was of much greater intensity.
^"In other words, to say that a period of overexpan-
sion or period of depression will last any given time, irrespec-
tive of the business activity of the country during such time,
is contrary to all basic law. Yet upon such reasoning most
of our predecessors have worked, while the others believed that
a change in conditions comes when figures for pig iron, bank
clearings or commodity prices reach a certain point, ^hey en-
tirely ignore the product of time and intensity. Only by
multiplying one by the other can the true reaction be ascer-
tained."
Cyclical Character of Fluctuations
Whether or not an individual believes in the necess-
ity for cycle fluctuations in business, the so-called business
cycle is a statistical fact, and as such must be given a great
deal of weight. It is important when making a study along
this line to consider the gradual growth of the country in
figuring the amount of business increase or decrease from year
to year.
Phases of Business Cycles
She business cycle is divided into four phases:
depression, recovery, prosperity, and decline, iiaoh of these
phases is distinguished by certain characteristics which are
1. Babson, Hoger W., BUSINESS BAPvOMSTSRS, 1929, P. 137.
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fairly well recognizable, and ivhich of conrse serve to iden-
tify the particular position In the cycle.
The low point of the business cycle is distinguished
by a very small volume of speculation, increase in bank re-
serves, and little business activity. It is also character-
ized by a mental depression, or a lack of confidence which
makes it difficult to secure orders even though prices are ex-
tremely low.
The second phase in the business cycle marks a change
from a general feeling of pessimism to a sentiment of confidence
in the future. Stock prices reflect substantial gains and the
general activity of the stock market increases. Commodity prices
show a brisk tendency to move upward and manufacturing concerns
find orders coming in at an increased rate. Corporations dur-
ing this period usually turn net losses into net profits. This
phase is called the period of recovery.
The next and third phase is a period of prosoerity.
Business is at a high ebb, wages rise, and there is a shortage
of help in many lines. Speculation runs ranoant with stock
prices daily making new highs. Conservatism has vanished
and over-confidence exists on every hand.
Just at the time when things seem to be reaching a
new high point, the decline comes. Wages and n&terials have
reached such a high point that net profits begin to fall off.
This diminuation in profits and the high interest rste causes
the prices of stocks to cease advancing and then to start
downwards. Banks start calling their loans and failures be-
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oome pronounced.
Uniformity and Variability of Business Cycles
Viie are alva.ya in some phase of the business cycle,
A review of business annals never discloses the existence of an
exact normeQ. state. Prosperity is elapsing into depression, or
becoming more intense, or breeding a crisis; a crisis is de-
generating into a panic, or subsiding into depression; depress-
ion is becoming deeper, or merging into a revival of prosperity.
Therefore, the only uniformity that exists is in the
course of business up or down. The depression may be very in-
tense followed by a period of recovery lasting several years.
In the past, some business cycles have lasted twelve years,
whereas others have been completed in as little as four years;
so really the only variability in business cycles is the dura-
tion, and the extent. ^"A revival of business activity does
not always develop into prosperity—sometimes it relapses in-
to depression. Such deviations from the usual course of events
occurred in the United States in 1892, 1895, and 1910, A
situation of intense strain, presenting the phenomena of crises,
sometimes follows a period of depression, instead of follow-
ing a period of prosperity; for example, the American stringency
of 1896 Every business cycle, strictly speaking, is
a unique series of events and has a unique explanation, be-
cause it is the outgrowth of a preceding series of events, like-
wise unique,"
1. Mitchell, Wesley Clair, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, P,449.

DURATION
In the history of this nation there have always "been
periods of depression, periods of over expansion, and intermed-
iate periods. There is absolutely no dispute in regard to this
statement. However, when it comes to a determination of the
duration of these periods there is a distinct difference of
opinion. "It is the general impression that the great major
trends axe of about twenty years* duration, and the minor move-
ments aversige 41 months* duration, with possibly still other
swings of about ten years* duration. Probably the most inter-
esting of the older works on this was by Samuel Benner, who,
from 1875 to 1884, formulated a most elaborate system of charts
and who, without doubt, clearly foretold the panics of 1884
and 1893, and the prosperous years intervening. Many other men
have devised other chstrts and theories, some based on supposed
economics and others based on superstition, but all have been
found to fail, and have been forgotten."
It can generally be said, therefore, that the dura-
tion of a. depression for the most part depends upon its sever-
ity. In reviewing some of the past depressions, it is inter-
esting to note how the duration varies with the severity. Start-
ing in 1863, the couutry enjoyed a marked period of prosoerity
for two and one-half years until the middle of 1865. Then
business encountered a severe depression which lasted only one
year, a direct contrast to this, it is interesting to note
that the middle of 1886 was the beginning of a period of pros-
1. Babson, Roger W., BU3I1JES3 BARO!,!ETERS, 1929, P. 137.
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perity which lasted seven years. This was followed by a de-
pression extending for a period of five and one-half years,
but it is interesting to note that this depression was not
very severe, and business throughout the depression stayed
at only 20 per cent below normal for a very short time.
Legislation of a controlling nature has at times
shortened the duration of depressions, but it has only worked
as a temporary expedient, and sooner or later the real de-
pression will run its course. Lhe passage of new legislation
aimed at the activities of business is all right providing it
is limited in amount.
The main factor that has an extremely important part
in the determination of the duration of a denression is that
1
of supply and demand. "Variations and productive activity are
closely related to changes in stocks. After the outbreak of
the crisis, manufacturers and merchants restrict their pur-
chases of raw materials which tend to fall in price; thus, while
stocks of raw materials held by the producers have increased
during the whole period of depression, it is probable that
stocks in the hands of manufacturers have declined the
stocks of manufactured goods held by manufacturers probably in-
creased a little in the early stages of the deoression, but
there is no evidence that they have continued to grow." The
condition just described is brought about by a decrease in the
demand. Of course, the first few new orders that come in will
1. Loveday, A., COURSE AND PHASES OF TEE WORLD ECOFO:riC
DEPRESSION, 1931, P.144.
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not cause business to pick up to any great extent, because of
the available supply which already exists. Eov/ever, an unus-
ual increase in the demand for goods will have a direct influ-
ence on the supply, and therefore it is this balance between
demand and supply that has a great influence on the duration
of depressions.
EXTMT 0? DEPRESS 10 K
3
Depressions may be limited to certain phases of gen-
eral, business such as a financial crisis, a commodity panic,
an industrial depression, or one that takes in general busi-
ness. Many of the past depressions have been due directly to
financial difficulties; for example, the Panic of 1857 was
the result of inadequate banking facilities, and as such was
limited more to the financial element of business. And fiigain,
in 1901 the chief cause of this brief Panic was a corner on
the stock exchange in Northern Pacific Stock. General busi-
ness showed little fluctuation in either direction. Certain
depressions have affected primarily commodities such as the
depression of the early twenty's, when the index of commodity
prices dropped from a high of 320 during the middle of 1920
to a low point of 150 in Jurie of 1921. This was the largest
known drop in the history of our country. This degression,
while it was known as a commodity panic originally, extended
into practically every line of business. The Depression of
1893-1898 wad also noted for the part played by commodity
prices, especially in the agricultural group.
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At least one depression was limited almost entire-
ly to manufacturing, and that took place during the years
1865 to 1866, It was very intense, and therefore did not
last very long because manufacturing revived in the latter
pscrt of 1866.
It is worthy to note that some past depressions have
originally started on a somewhat limited scope, and have fi-
nally extended into other fields of business activity. Others
due to certain circumstances have been restricted to the one
field. Perhaps the best example of a depression that affected
the entire business field was the long International DeDress-
ion of 1870. Every type of business, every financial organiza-
tion, and every phase of the agricultural situation was de-
pressed. Of course the most recent example which certainly
has cove- ed every conceivable business organization was the
Depression of 1930 to 1933. This was the most far reaching
that our nation has ever exoerienced.
A general depression is described by one authority as
follows: ^a period during which deoression spreads over the
whole field of business and grows more severe. Consumers' de-
mand declines in consequence of whole discharges of wa^e-
earnera, the gradual exhaustion of past savings, and the re-
duction of other classes of family income. V.'ith consumers*
demand falls the business demand for raw materials, current
supplies, and equipment used in making consumers' goods. Still
more severe is the shrinkage of investors* demand for oonstmo-
1. Mitchell, Wesley Glair, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, P. 577.
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tion work of all kinds, sinoe few individuals or enterprises
care to sink money in new business ventures so long as trade
remains depressed and the price level is declining. Ihe con-
traction in the physical volume of business which results from
these several shrinkages in demand is cumulative, since every
reduction of employement causes a reduction of consumers' de-
mand, and every decline in consumers' demand depresses current
business demand and discourages investment, thereby causing
further discharges of employees and reducing consumers' demand
once more." Thus every phase of business is affected.
GURREITT THEORIES AS TO THE CAUSE OF BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS
A correct estimate of the causes of business depress-
ions must receive an intelligent study before one can ascertain
the effects and also the cures of deoressions. The primary
causes offered may generally be reduced to two—over specula-
tion and the general decline in the level of commodity prices.
Over speculation always causes trouble, and requir es contin-
uous correction. However, it is a less important cause of
business recession than the drop in commodity prices. The far
reaching and disastrous effects of a rapid downward movement
in the commodity price level are not appreciated in their full
significance by the great majority of people. It should be
pointed out, however, that high prices do not necessarily make
prosperity, nor do low prices produce adversity. It is the
movement of prices that counts, and the extent of change is
the real factor.
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There have been many individual theories as to the
specific causes for depressions, the majority of v/hich will
be discusaed in the following pages.
Competition
Destructive competition has been the cause of many
business failures. This competition comes from sources that
are unacquainted Vv'ith the actual cost of production, selling
cost, and final profits. Once the demand for goods has been
created, these concerns seem to set a price below the average
charged by the reputable concerns, xhen, on account of the
low price which they quoT^e, they receive large orders. In
the production of these goods and their ulti mate sale, these
concerns are really using up part of their capital on every
order they send out. ihe legitimate manufacturer cannot meet
these prices and make a reasonable profit. They therefore
curtail their production, and it is not long until their "cut
throat" competitors become bankrupt, causing a decrease in
the amount of business activity,
V/ith unfair competition eliminated, or at least
considerably lessened, comoetitive rivalry, on a sound and
fair basis instead of beiLg done away with, becomes still
keener. It is the unfair competition that is one of the
causes of our business recessions,
1
"It has been said that, even in so-called normal
1, Valenstein, Lawrence, BUSIi.ESS Ul DEH TEL HECOVZRY ACT,
1932. P. 104,
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tir.ies, only 20 per cent of t're companies in business make a
profit th-it would exceed the returns that could be obtained if
the money invested were simply kept in a savings bank
This state of a,ffairs may be larf^ely attributed to uncontrolled
competition. With business rivalry placed on a more sensible
basis, profits should again flow into business and, as it does,
merchandising efforts will be altered accordingly
Given a better type of competition on the one hand, and a
broader adoption of modern cost accounting methods on the other
,
and at least a portion of the enormous losses that have re-
suited from improper pricing should be wiped out and profits
substituted."
Destructive and uncontrolled competition are both
attributing causes to depressions, but fair competition booms
business and results in subsequent prosperity.
Discrepancy between Wages and Productivity
The contiiiUally growing productivity of industry calls
for a corresponding growth of a market for the oroducts of in-
dustry if disaster is to be avoided. But to enable producers
to sell their growing output promptly, prices must be reduced
and wages must be increased in proportion to the supply of new
goods. ^OT it is only by combining an increase in the money
income of the majority of the people with a decrease in the
cost of commodities ths.t a nations' home markets can be kept
expanding with the progress of industrial methods. A decrease
in wages fundamentaxly , adversely affects the purchasing power
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of the public, it is this decrease in the purchasirjg noiwer
that hurts business. Orders fall off, and manufacturers, in
order to compensate for the decrease in business, must cur-
tail the number of employees. These various curtailment
steps are cumulative, and therefore have a much more severe
effect on business. The germ of the trouble, then, is tl-e
tendency of prices to fall during periods of decreasing pro-
ductivity. It is impossible to maintain prices along vpith
an increase in unemployment, and furthermore, it is imooss-
ible to maintain wa<es over a protracted period of decreasing
productivity. This is a very important cause of many of the
past economic dilemmas.
Overcapitalization
Any one among many causes may so affect supply and
demand as to cause the prices of some important group of
commodities to rise. This advance is carried all along the
line tending to raise the prices of all related commodities,
and results in a concentration of purchasing pover in the
handB of those ??ho own the goods which have advanced in price.
This concentration of purchasing pov;er converted into the form
of muney causes an accumulation of capital in the hands of a
few, who, unable to spend or increase their consumption as
quickly as their income has risen, desire to increase their
profits by investment.
This larger supply of capital coming into the finan-
cial markets leads to a greater demand for the means of pro-
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duction. Thus they receive a greater price for the 1136 of
their money which further increases their profits ultimte-
ly, resulting in a further concentration of purchasing pov.er
in the hands of a few. The orocess is once again repeated,
and soon reaches industries which turn out capital goods and
indu3trii;^l equipment. But finally, the process works its own
reversal. The centralization of purchasing power in the hands
of a small capitalistic class reduces the purchasing newer of
the masses. Even though a few people have a vast quantity
of purchasing power, it does not help business as much as
spreading a small part of the purchasing power over the entire
mass of the population.
In the end, therefore, the failure of consumption to
expand at approximately the same rate as the accumulation of
capital and the means of production in which the capital is
iiiVested, inevitably causes consumers' and producers' goods
to fall in price.
^"Thus prosperity and depression are two unlike
results of the same cause--over-oapitalization. That is, the
ceaseless striving of productive energy to keep profitably
employed causes production to expand more rapidly than consump-
tion, and infallibly produces a maladjustment with alternat-
ing periods of expansion and contraction. The roots of the
difficulty lie deep in the capitalistic organization of society,
which separates the individual's activity in production from
1. Mitchell, Vbesley Clair. BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, P.10.
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his activity in consumption, and so favors inequality in the
distribution of wealth—a condition which is both cause and
consequence of over-capitalization,"
Dissimilar Price iUuctuations of Producers' and Consumers'
Groods
A slight rise in the price of consumers' goods will
cause a much greater change in the profits made by a manufac-
turing concern; that is, if the volume of output and expenses
remain the same. This condition would lead to larger invest-
ments in the form of producers' goods. With the proscects of
making larger profits on the same amount of capital invested,
many investors would be led to this field. The resulting larger
market for oroducers ' goods again stimulates the production of
such goods, and has the tendency to withdraw productive energy
from the manufacturing of so-called consumers' goods. The
cycle is then repeated because the lari^er market resulting
from the increase in production of producers' goods tends to
raise the price of consumers' goods still higher, which in
turn again stimulates still further the creation of producers'
goods.
There is no check to this tendency until the new
investments in the stock of producers' goods begin to supply
the market with greater queuatities of consumers* goods. Im-
mediately, the value of consumers' goods declines, which in
turn produces a still greater fall in the value of producers'
goods, and so the process contirues with greater rapidity.
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If it were only possible for the price of equipment
with which we produce our goods to remain at the same level as
the goods produced, one of the oontributing causes to a great
many of our past depressions would "be eliminated. In recent
years, the fluctuations in the prices of consumers' goods as
compared with the values of producers' goods have not been so
great, and therefore the ailments of the last few depressions
cannot be attributed to this cause.
Contraction of Credit
Bank credit is one of the vitalities of business. The
majority of business enterprises cannot get along throughout a
protracted period of tine without bank loans, large or small.
Shis fact applies especially to companies that carry large in-
ventories during certain seasons of the year. The amount of
business they do depends a great deal on the line of credit
they are able to obtain at the banks. Incidentally, one cause
of the failure of a good many concerns is the use of the bank
credit in the financing of capital improvements or extensions.
Bank credit should only be used for working capital purposes,
and the carrying of inventories.
^•'Panics are storms and it seems that these finan-
cial storms would not occur if people did not borrow for spec-
ulation or for capital requirements. Hence, when one so
borrows, he endangers both himself and the entire eommunity.
He truly is an undesirable citizen.
"The forced selling of oonmodities , real estate, and
1. Babson, hogerW., PI^HTIKG BUSINESS DEPRESSICITS. 1932, P. 35.
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seourities causes the abnormal breaks in prices
Ihose who are forced to sell at a loss are those ^ho are
borrowing on the commodities, real estate, and securities and
are forced to sell. It is this forced selling which forces
prices to abnormally low figures. Furthermore, as prices con-
tinue to drop, more and more loans are weakened and other per-
sons are forced to sell. Thus every day adds to the difficulty,
which finally ends in panic and in complete housecleaning at
that level."
It is because the majority of business enterprises
have to borrow to meet current requirements that any contrac-
tion of credit by the banks causes an immediate decrease in
business. The Depression of 1920-21 when so many concerns
were stocked up with inventories at excessively high prices is
a good examole of the results of credit contraction, when as
previously stated, commodities dropped from 520 to 150. The
major part of this drop was due to forced liquidation of in-
ventories.
Panics and Unforeseen Circumstances
Panics may be of a temporary nature or they may ex-
tend into a protracted period. In the past, the majority .of
panics have been of a financial nature, although one or two
of the important ones have had to do with commodities. If a
panic is of a severe nature, it usually causes a general bus-
iness depression, unless some form of control or remedy is
offered immediately. Therefore, panics at ti :e3 are the cause
of degressions.
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At times depressions are caused by unforeseen ciroxim-
stances, such as have happened in the past, namely, cecession
troubles, severe crop failures, anti-trust scares, and the
outbreak of an unexpected war. These factors, if not controlled
immediately, may lead to a brief period of business recession,
or if severe enough, my cause general business conditions to
decline far belov; normal.
One other important factor along these same lines
is that of the sudden discovery of the fraudulent and dis-
honest action on the part of one of the leaders in business
and finance. The Insull case perhaps is a good examole, and
although the country was submerging into the depths of de-
pression ^hen the dishonesty of Insull was discovered, yet
no doubt, it accelerated the oace of recession. Shortly x)re-
vious to this might also be mentioned in passing, the similar
case of Mr. Zrueger. Kq particular depression can be directly
attributed to these latter causes, but nevertheless, they all
add to the uneasiness of the situation.
Overspeculation
"^"Speculation is the act of making a purchase thut
involves risk of loss, but also offers a chance for consider-
able profit. Speculation is the intelligent assumption of
risk for the purpose of rendering a definite service."
This form of speculation is more or less of a limited
nature, and if properly controlled will cause no great degree
of trouble. Speculation has its economic use in providing a
1. Babson. Roger W., IFVESTMENT HJIxDAT!ENTkLS, 1930. P. 280
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oonstant market at which securities may at any time "be bought
and sold. It is the conception of many people that specula-
tion is an unnecessary element ii. our economic life, and that
those who en^ge in such activities perform no service to so-
ciety. If they acquire wealth by this means, it is not con-
sidered the result of honest toil.
Overspeculation, however, in a form that is really
gambling, does a great deal of harm to existing peace condi-
tions. The last deoression was caused, to a great extent, by
oversoeculation in the Stock llarket. "^"Its effects unbalanced
an already serious situation and accelerated the speed of the
business decline, destroying the fortunes of large numbers of
Americans. Retailers were amo r.g the first to act. The first .
dramatic stock market crash in October was almost immediately
followed by a decrease in orders placed by them, and by a
reduction of their inventories. The result was an abrupt
slackening in the demand for the production of consumer goods,
and, as the production of consumer goods is identical with the
consumption of producers' goods, there were very soon no reason-
able limits to the reduction of demand."
Of course, speculation cannot be carried to the danger
point without an expansion of bank credit, esoeoially extensive
speculation in a wide range of commodities. ^"_he soeculative
buying slov:s down, it is accompanied by the complaint of soec-
ulators th it the banks will not let them have "any money to do
business with," The speculative buying which took place in this
1. Mazur, Paul M. , NEW ROADS TO PHOSPEl-ITY. 1931, P. 7.
2. i'oater, William Trufant, I.liEY, 1923. P. 242.
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oountry during 1919 could not have occurred under a tarter
economy; nor oould it have occurred under a monetary system
which permitted increases of money and bank credit only in
proportion to the rate of increase in production or in vol-
ume of trade. The unprecedented increase in bank loans en-
abled many speculative middlemen, of no economic advantage
to the community, to thrust themselves into the processes of
distribution and retard the flow of goods."
Overspeculation is a factor in every commercial cri-
sis, because under our present monetary system, it autoraaticsilly
boosts prices and causes a great amount of indebtedness based
on an inflated currency, which of course almost prohibits the
debtor from paying his debts. Whether speculation will con-
tinue to be a major cause of business crises depends upon leg-
islation of a controlling nature.
Overproduction and Underproduction
It has been ascertained after much study that over-
production is one of the most frequently alleged causes for
our great industrial calamities. ^"The theory of overproduc-
tion is founded upon the belief that by the introduction of
machinery, improved methods, etc., it is possible for man to
produce more than man is able to buy, or more than man desires
to acquire."
Overproduction has been a cause of depressions al-
most since the beginning of the early history of our country.
2
"Tobacco was not only the staole crop of I.Iaryland and Vir-
1. Hull, J^eo. C, li^DUSTRIAL DEP?^SSIONS, 1911. P.84.
2, Adams, James T., THE mROH C.^ DEI.DCRACY, 1932. P. 36.
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ginia but also served as currency in the absence of coin,
and frequent trouble arose from fluctuations in value. Be-
fore 1675 there had been for some ti .e much distress in the
Colony owing to the low prices of what was at once crop and
currency. This was due in part to overproduction..."
It must be remembered that during the progressive in-
flation which makes possible the business boom, there is orig-
ination of excess purchasing power in the form of credit granted
by the banks. This flood of new money flows out into the
channels of trade with the folloring result: various producers
find themiD elves m'aking unusually large profits; in order to take
advantage of the increasing demand, they naturally increase their
productive facilities. This results in an increase of business
all along the line as well as a general rise in oxices. "^"There
are individuals who point accusingly at manufacturers and other
producers with the cry that more things are made than people
want. And on the other hand, there are those who point accus-
ingly at the money-credit system and denounce it for failure
to furnish enough money so that people can buy and consume what
is currently produced."
Depression may also be caused by a disproportionate
overproduction. There may be too much sugar and coffee and not
enough wool and cotton. Such a situation might well be re-
flected in a price decline for sugar and coffee and a rise in
wool Jand cotton. Of course if the overproduction exists in the
necessities of life, it will have a greater effect on business
activity
.
1. Harwood, E. C, CAUSE AlTD CONTROL 0"^ THE BUSINESS CYGL?,, 193E,
P. 78.
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Ju3t at the present ti iC there is much agitation
for the control of production of the farm aa well as for the
control of industries so that certain overproduction will not
cause another stagnation of business as it has done so many
times in the past.
Interest Rates
There are times v;hen bankers refuse to extend fur-
ther loans because they have exhausted their reserves, or be-
cause they have little faith or confidence in the ability of
their customers to reoay the loans. Such often has been the
case during the latter part of oeriods of prosperity and dur-
ing periods of liquidation. Bankers m^ke their profits from
loans to custumera and during periods of depression they of
course reduce the rate of interest and discount as an induce-
ment to their customers to make greater loans. ^"Low rates of
interest during periods of deoression do not induce business
men to borrow heavily from banks. And durin:^ periods of pros-
perity high interest rates do not deter them from borrowing
heavily from banks, because prospective gross profits axe
large."
Interest rates after they exceed a certain figure,
aay 6 per cent, have a great deal to do with the lack of
further expansion of credit. Business men are willing to pay
.
a reasonable price for the use of money, but when this price
is excessive, they must curtail production, and thus reduce
the volume of business they are doing. Carrying it a step fur-
1. Adams, Arthur B., ECOIIOMICS 0? BUSINESS CYCLES, 1925, P.109.
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ther, high interest rates cause a contraction of credit, which
in turn is followed b^^ a decline in the general price level.
Interest rates may therefore be considered an in-
direct attributing cause of depressions because business to-
day nnist borrow for working capital purposes, and are there-
fore apprehensive when an increase in interest rates takes
place.
Legislation
Legislation at times works undue hardship on general
business. "^"When the larger units of production, distribution
and commerce first began to appear and displace the smaller,
it aroused in the public a spirit of opposition that found
political expression in the slogan "Bust and trust," Strin-
gent and drastic lav.s were enacted forbidding all combinations
in restraint of trade, but the trusts and monopolies contin-
ued to grow under them as they had never grown before."
Legislation of this type was the principal cause of
the Depression of 1911. I'he large corporations at that time
were doing a great volume of business, which of course en-
abled business in general to expand. V^ith the proposed elim-
ination of these large units the investing public as well as
the consuming public became frightened, and felt that with the
disintegration of these large corporations, business would se-
verely suffer. Mever was there a more convinoiiig illustration
of the futility of pasting laws that had for their principal
purpose the arresting of the march of economic progress. The
1. Thomas, A. P.. THE WAY OUT, 1922. P. 146.
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publics mind had oome to recognize the economic superiority of
these large aggregations, and to appreciate their ability to
render more efficient service at a lov;er price than would be
possible with numerous smaller units. In the first place, if
governmental legislation were attempted on a scale and to an
extent th&t would offer grounds for even a hooe that it would
be effective, the great complexity of it all would make it
utterly iinpractioable* lousiness could not function under such
a system,
Although the Depression of 1911 is the only one that
was caused directly by legislation, a few of the other minor
ones had for their principal cause legislative difficulties,
such as the governmental control of the railroads, and un-
necessary controlling legislation against the stock market.
Co-operative legislation with a minimum of political
influence has achieved much in the past as an aid to business,
taxation
Taxation has been a very important problem since the
inception of our first form of government in this country,
^"The problem of the government is to fix rates which will
bring in a maximum amount of revenue to the treasury and at the
same time bear not too heavily on the taxpayer or on business
enterprises, A sound tax policy must take into consideration
three factors. It must produce sufficient revenue for the
Grovernment; it must lessen, so far as possible, the burden of
taxation on those least able to bear it; and it must alsc re-
1. Mellon, Andrew W., TaZATIOK : THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS, 1924.
P. 9.
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move these influences which might retard the continued steady
development of business and industry on which, in the last
analysis, so much of our prosperity depends."
When the burden of taxation becomes extremely heavy,
business men pause and wonder whether it is worth while for
them to put forth such a great effort on their own business
to produce profits, and then turn around and pay over to the
'viovernment the major part of the profits in the form of taxes.
This attitude although correct and justifiable has a detri-
mental effect on business, and while it co'ild not be considered
a major cause of depression, yet especially in recent years it
has become a factor which must be given considerable attention.
Furthermore, taxation also has an adverse effect
upon business in an indirect way. An income tax on the income
received by individuals, if it becomes a noticeable burden,
causes these individuals to invest a greater proportion of
their capital in tax exempt securities. This tendency causes
a flow of capital into governmental, state, and municipal Bond
Markets, which is particularly felt by businesses that re-
quire a great deal of capital in the form of bonded indebted-
ness, namely, the railroads and public utilities. The rever-
sal of the flow of capital from legitimate business to public
bonds makes it almost impossible for the railroads and public
utilities to obtain new financing for necessary improvements
or for the refunding of maturing securities. This retardation
on the part of these two major industries causes a sieving up
of enough volume along with other factors to result in a de-
pression.
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On the other hand, the adoption of a sound system of
taxation will have a favorable effect in many directions. It
will help the building industry, it would ntike possible lower
freight and passenger rates by getting the railroads back on
an efficiency basis, and it would also promote ii;dustrial and
business activity by diverting into productive enterorise funds
which are now going into tax exempt securities. Heavy taxa-
tion increases unemployment and unemployment leads to a business
depression.
Psychological
Human nature is very changeable, and cannot be de-
pended upon for any great length of time. In fact, at times
just some particular whim of fancy may cause a serious bus-
iness collapse. It does not take long for mob psychology to
spread throughout the entire business realm. We have just re-
cently passed through what was called by many the "New Era".
Men of profound ability made numerous statements to the effect
that we were in a period of everlasting prosperity, that the
dark days of unemployment and business recession were gone
forever. It was this same wsychological feeling which carried
this country to absurd heights and later caused the collanse of
the high plateau of prosperity.
This same psychological condition also exists during
periods of depression, at which time many economists go on
record as saying that business has been definitely placed on
a much lower level, and that from now on, we must prt up with
a great amount of unemployment, much smaller profits, and a

lessened volume of business
.
Psychological factors do not cause either periods of
depression or periods of nrosoerity . '-^'he.y are a part of them.
It is possible, however, for this factor to accelerate or re-
tard the pace of business recession or recovery. In the troughs
of depression a general feeling of confidence will do much to
stem and even turn the tide of business. Optimistic feeling
among the masses has a great effect on business conditions.
Distress Selling
i'he wholesale discharges of employees which occur
during the first part of the crisis cause a decline in con-
sumers' demand, ihe majority of corporations up until this
time have been manufacturing on an expanded scale, and there-
fore have large inventories of saleable goods on hand. The
sale of new merchandise is almost at a standstill, iilong with
the regular employees, business and professional men are also
compelled to cut down on their purchases. Clothing and fur-
niture are used longer before being discarded, and are re-
placed at urgent need by cheap articles.
Banks, due to the seriousness of the situation,
start calling in many of their comiaercial loans. Iifenufactur-
ers in order to keep their credit in good standing, and also
to repay the bank upon demand, must raise cash. Knowing that
to sell their inventory at the previously existing price level
within a reasonable period of time would be impossible, they
must sell the inventory for whatever it will bring, usually at
a distress sale. This further deflates the price level of oon-
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Bumers' goods. "^i^he processes v/hich cause this shrinking in
the volume of trade, like the processes v/hich cause an increase
in times of revival, are cumulative in their efforts. The more
workmen are discharged the smaller becomes consumers' demand.
Ever.y reduction in consumers' demand causes a further decline
in the business demand for the materials from which consumers'
goods are made. On the one hand, this latter decline causes
more Mvorkmen to be discharged, and on the other hand it dis-
courages mnagers from making the repairs and renewals which
they have in mind, and discourages capitalists from putting
their new projects under contract. The longer these plans for
imDroving and extending the industrial equipment are deferred,
the less grovs employment in the enterprises which provide
materials. And the longer men remain wholly or partly idle,
the more are their families forced to scrimp expenditures, so
that consumers' demand shrinks still further, and this shrink-
age further intensifies the influences which are constricting
the volume of business." Thus, a deoression caused by distress
selling is started. Distress selling may be a result of cut
throat competition.
Volume of Currency
In our present economic structure, bank deposits have
largely replaced metallic and paper money as our medium of ex-
change. Therefore the volume of currency does not have any
great noticeable effect on business conditions. It must be re-
1. Mitchell, Wesley Clair, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1933, P. 557.

membered, though, that during times of financial strain, the
masses have a tendency to hoard money, At such times there
must be a great expansion in the volume of currency outstand-
ing in the hands of the public.
iold is usually considered as primary money and the
foundation upon which the supply of credit money is based. Bus-
iness is therefore to a certain extent tied up to the increase
or decrease in the existing supply of gold. However, since
credit money is not limited to the exact amount of gold, but
is only on a percentage basis, this cause of business depress-
ions is not a orimary one. The velocity of circulation is of
more importance than the volume of currency.
The Price Level
Fluctuations in the price level have a great deal to
do in determining the trend of future business. When prices
commence to decline, many manufacturers have on band large
quantities of their products and of materials ready for fab-
rication, ii'or a time they are able to fill their orders from
stock without making new oonmiitments for raw materials. V. hen
they are finally forced to enter the market as buyers, knowing
that prices are following a course of slow decline, they will
engage in hand-to-mouth purchasing. Hence, the demand for
raw materials declines more abruptly than that for finished
products, and their relative prices change in accordance with
the relative changes in demand.
This is also true conversely. When the price level
reflects a rising tendency, purchasers of raw materials rush
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in to the market a-nd make long terra ooramitmen'- 8 , which have
a tendency, of course, to increase the rate of "business ac-
tivity.
The price level, furthermore, determines to a ^eat
extent the orders placed with manufacturers by wholesalers.
If wholesalers notice that prices are showing a tendency to
ease, their orders will call for only their immediate needs.
V/hereas, on the other hand, if wholesalers sense a coming
rise in prices, they will immediately send large orders to
the manufacturers. The results either way are cumulative, suid
therefore are priinary causes for periods of business inactiv-
ity, or seasons of prosperity.
The Velocity of Circulation
During periods of good business there has usually been
a rather rapid circulation of currency and bank deposits. Under
our present system of Bank Reserves deposits can expand ten
times. That is to say, if a deposit is made in one bank amount-
ing to $1,000, this same deposit may expand into total depos-
its of 4»10,000. i'or example. Bank A receives the deoosit of
J|pl,000 from a customer. It iimnediately must set aside a re-
serve of -^100 which is of course ten per cent. It is then free
to lend the remaining ^900. It does so and as a result $900
will be deposited in Bank B. This bank also carries through the
same routine by setting aside ten per cent of the deposit, name-
ly ^90, and lends the remaining ^810. iiubseouently this ^810
reaches Bank C in the form of a deposit and once again the ex-
pansion of bank deposits is carried out. If every bank finally
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lends its deposits out to the full amount of the law, as
stated above, the ij^l.OOO eventually amounts to $10,000. This,
of coui'se, means that due to the fast velocity of circulation
^1,000 is imde to do the work of ^10,000,
It must be noted, however, that if for example Bank
C bad not lent the lawful amount against its cu3tomer^l' de-
posit the multiple expansion of Bank Deposits wonld have reached
only about ^3,000, instead of the |10,000 already mentioned.
Therefore, velocity of circulation has a great deal
to do with the starting of business reactions. The minute one
bank starts to contract its loans, it immediately slows up the
velocity of circulation and causes a slov.ing down of business,
which, if followed by any great quantity of banks, will cause
serious business retardation. "^"Were it not for the lag of
cash balances and the consequent alternating excess and de-
ficiency of bank reserves, a state of equilibrium might be
reached."
Deflation
A persistent policy of deflation may result in a
major business depression or in greatly prolonging the recovery
from depression. Ihe depression of 1865-66 is a good example
of this.
2
"In 1875, V:ten the -cvesumption Act was passed, the
United States was on a non-redeemable oaper-ourrency basis.
1. Hansen, ii.lvin Harvey, BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY, 1927, P. 142.
2. Persons, Vv-arren M. , FORECASTING BUSINESS CYCLES, 1931,
P. 55.
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I'he Resumption Act provided for the resumption of soeoie pay-
ments on January 1, 1879, on which date the country would be
on the same monetary basis as the other leading commercial
countries. -But this deflation process was denressin^ to b^isi-
ness
Continued deflation is always disastrous to business.
It is true that it is easier for people to pay off their mort-
gages and their other debts during a oeriod of deflation, but
this is only a small advantage, and furthermore, very few
people at a time like this have the money to do so an.vway.
With deflation ensuing, business men lose confidence
and do not order or oroduce in as large quantities as they
would under other circumstances. Inflation if not controlled,
of coarse, may have an even more disastrous effect than defla-
tion. However, (Jermany set such a bad example ii. manioulaticg
the mark that other countries will control inflation. There-
fore, it is generally thought that deflation is more dangerous,
because it destroys confidence, initiative, and foresight.
The Gold Standard
The production of gold during the past century has
not increased with the same degree of rapidity as the v;orld's
business. This increase in business naturally caused 'an in-
creased demand for metallic money, occasioned by larger trans-
actions and a larger extent of commercial operations. Thus,
the Durchasing power of metallic money was increased and at
the same time it worked a hardshin on debtors.
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1
"While this question is not free from doubt, it
would seem that the greater production of gold will tend to
postpone the aporoaoh of a depression and mitigate its sever-
ity when it comes. This greater production tends to increase
prices and to maintain the supply of money required for en-
larged commercial and industrial operations."
iingland during the first part of 1930 was in a stc^te
of business inactivity, due mostly to a tremendous loss of
gold. As soon as she went off the gold^standard, immediately
a marked degree of recovery was noticed. The same is true in
this country although in our case we had a major portion of
the worlds' supply of gold. Many economists believed that
the last depression would not have been so severe if we had
gone off the gold standard long before we did.
When one considers the billions and billions of
dollars worth of bonds that are payable in gold, and then
contrasts this astounding total with the actual monetary
supply of gold in existence, one begins to wonder how we can
ever continue to do business on the old gold standard basis.
Yihen money is on a gold basis, it is a standard of
purchasing power for the coimnodity called gold and gold only.
The value of gold like that of any other commodity is affected
by changes in supply and demand. Both the supply of gold suad
the demand for gold not only may change from period to neriod,
but are certain to change.
Therefore, especially in recent depressions, the
1. Burton. Theodore E.. ?IlIAlJCrAL CHISES, 1986, P.3C5.
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gold standard has been a major contributing cause.
Turning too much Circulating Capital into Fixed Canital
The fact that business men turned too much circu-
lating capital into fixed caoital is one of the chief causes
of the mysterious industrial depressions vjhich come in the
absence uf an.y apparent cause. When a business man 2:0 es to
the bank to negotiate a loan and is successful, he is making
use of circulating capital, or as some terra it, working cap-
ital. This working capital may be used to carxy inventories
or perhaps to carry accounts or notes receivable during the
peak period of business demand. ThxS is a legitimate use of
circulating capital.
On the other hand, when the same business man goes
to the bank and borrows circulating capital to use for the
construction of a new factory building or perhaps for the
purchase of new equipment, he is using this money for capital
purposes and therefore it may take years for this same circu-
lating capital to get back into use. In other words, he must
pay back this loan from profits he makes from the increased
efficiency of the new factory building or of the new equip-
ment, and of course considerable amount of time is involved.
This tying up of circulating capital in the form of
new buildings and new equipment robs business of much needed
credit. Other customers of the bank can borrow just so much
less on this account and therefore they cannot produce as
much or carry such a large inventory. These conditions with-
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out doubt decrease and unsettle tusinesa conditions and while
not a primary oause of depression, must be given a great deal
of consideration.
High and Low Tariff
Tariffs are determined largely by political influ-
ence brought about by interested parties. tariff in it-
self is not intrinsically good or bad. It is a tool, not the
finished product. Used intelligently, in its proper place,
it is an instrument which will bring about certain desired re-
sults. £5ut it is not a result in itself. The condition de-
sired is a properly balanced world trade. Tariffs affect vorld
trade and, if skillfully employed, insure a proper balance."
It goes without question that the lov.ering of tariffs
has a tendency to deflate prices and increase imports of cheap
goods. This vould lower living costs materially and in turn
reduce wages, salaries, and other production costs for all
commodities of domestic origin.
High tariffs have a tendency to increase the price
level, and at times to such an eztent as to decrease the de-
mand for certain commodities. This decrease, of co'orse, is '^Iso
bad for business. The inflation of domestic prices oronDtly
is reflected in an increase in the cost of living and in all
production costs. When domestic prices rise and world prices
remain stationary, it becomes more and more profitable to ini-
port less, and less so to export. Sooner or later prices must
be deflated by reducing tariffs, or they must be further stim-
1. Lee, Alva, aHEH.C.^ SWIIISS TO EER L^T, 1933, P. 57.
i
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ulated "by additional tariff increasea. Of course this oersia-
tent policy of increasing tariff rates finally reaches the
point when it fails to stimulate business, and leads to busi-
ness readjustment, and nay v;ith other related problems lead
to a severe business depression.
Immigration
One of the v;orst evils of immigration is the bringing"
into the country of a vast supply of cheap labor, i^lthough
this labor is more or less inefficient, yet the price oaid
for it is so far below that paid to American workmen that a
considerable profit is realized.
Immigrants are not accustomed to our so-called high
standard of living and they spend very little for the ordi-
nary necessities of life and very seldom if ever make pur-
chases in the luxury class. This condition has two adverse
effects; it throws the American workman out of employment; and
secondly, it decreases the price level owing to a slackening
in demand for goods.
This cause is fundamentally a theoretical one, be-
cause in the early history of our country the influx of im-
migration did much in aiding our rapid development, and fur-
thermore, in the last few years im-.iigrat ion has been very
greatly restricted.
Foreign factors
Unsettled conditions in foreign countries have done
much to unstabilize American industry and finance. Perbaos the

-85-
orowning example of thia may be found in the recently passed
world wide depression. The United States ty the middle of
1931 had sufferred what was thought to be a great depression,
and at that time business conditions were beginning to stabil-
ize. In fact, slight increases in the fundamental business
indices were beginning to appear, when suddenly European con-
ditions became critical. Many European countries were prac-
tically on the verge of sudden bankruptcy, business was plunged
into the depths of depression, and financial conditions were
deplorable,
The already returning confidence which was becoming
rather noticeable in this country was immediately reversed
and once again we started our downward trend. This country
with our vast production facilities cannot exist without a
reasonable amount of foreign trade, and of course this foreign
trade, just at the time it was needed, was not available.
One other similar situation is that of our foreign
private debts, and also the much discussed war debts. The
inability of foreign countries to meet these payments, let
alone the interest due on them, has caused a great deal of
uneasiness. It has also robbed this country of a considerable
amount of working capital due to the original transfer of thia
money across the water. Foreign factors may therefore be con-
sidered one of the major causes,
Vrfeather suid Business Cycles
Agricultural prices have a great deal to do with bus-
iness conditions, and as auoh may cause unsettled conditions.
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1
"Such a clue to the general course of regular economic changes
in the United States and to the causes in which they originate
is given by the rhythmic changes in the weather,"
2
"As the most fundamental need of mankind is the need
for food, it seems probable that the observed rhythmical econom-
ic changes may be -produced by the physical cause through its
effect upon the food supply. If this be so, then, as the fluc-
tuations of the food supply are known to be subject to the
supposed caprices of the weather, it seems not unlikely that
the physical cause may be one or more of the elemental forces
that are summarized under the term weather. The variation in
the (juantity of the rainfall is one of the weather changes
known to have a marked effect upon the yield of the croos, and
if this fact is taken into consideration with the preceding
•reasoning, we have a working theory as to the cause of
Economic Cycles: The Obanges in the weather represented by
the changes in the quantity of rainfall cause the changes in
the yield per acre of the crops, and the variations in the
yield of the crops cause the economic changes known as Econom-
ic Cycles."
Therefore, it may be said that a recheck of the major
depressions of the past prove that agricultural conditions have
had a great deal to do with their severity, and of course
weather conditions are a direct contributing cause.
1, Moore, Henry Ludwell, GENEEL\TING ECONOIvHC CYCLES, 1923, ?.l.
2, Moore, Heriry Ludwell, EGOi.'OMIC CYCLES: THEIP LkV! ArD 0Ai^<5:
1914, P,136.
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Politioal Conditions
Politics have a direct effect upon business. In
recent years business men have been more interested in the
"banks of the Potomac than in the banks of Wall Street."
legislation that has been passed currently has had much to
do directly with business, iiovernmental regulation of busi-
ness is becoming very pooular; these radical steps might
work, and they might not. Whether the government will di-
rectly control business, or merely act as a silent partner,
depends largely upon what politioal influence carries the
most weight. In the past, depressions have been accelerated
by the results of presidential elections, the passage of
unpopular legislation, and the threat by politicians to
pass laws of a detrimental nature.
The silver campaign back in 1893 and 1894 had much
to do with that depression, and of course this trouble was
due to a politioal nature. Politicians are generally not
good business men, and therefore, they cause unsettled con-
ditions. The adjournment of Congress is usually a sign
that business conditions over the near term will improve.
At the oresent time one depressing factor which of course is
of a politioal nature is the New Securities Act. The pur-
pose of this Act, namely, to divert money from "Wall Street"
to "Llain Street" is excellent, but the execution of it has
caused a serious curtailment of business enterprise. Under
the Act, it is impossible for business to obtain money in
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the oapital market for extensive improvement a , let alone ob-
tain money for refunding purposes.
Therefore, political conditions and the laws that
are passed as a result of their influence have teen the means
of either starting or accelerating business depressions.
Effects of Business Depressions
Business depressions alter in many respects our ways
8uid means of - doing business. Each subsequent depression re-
sults in the discovery of new business principles, new methods
of financing, more efficient production measures, and many
new economic theories and problems.
PIIMCUL CEANSES
Perhaps the greatest change brought about along
financial lines is that of new financing. Under the great
speculative enthusiasm of the preceding period of prosoer-
ity, when large corporations needed money, the most pop-
ular way of obtaining toese funds was through an issue of,
or increasing of the common stock. The investing public
seemed to take up these issues of common stock with a great
deal of enthusiasm. However, since the great deoression, we
have changed our point of view, and now, when a corporation
needs money, the public demands first mortgage bonds,—thdt
is, all things being equsuL , without considering the New Se-
curities Act, or the possibility of inflation. This n&K fi-
nancing, furthermore, must be of a more restrictive nature,
and thoroughly eliminated of all water.
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In order to enable business ooncerns to weather the
atorm and emerge into the recovery period, banks become more
lenient with overdue loans and grant a further extension of
credit at even a decrease in the rate of interest. Banks also
are willing to grant new loans, but on a more conservative
basis, and upon more elaborate investigation than they had
thought was necessary during the prosperous tinies.
Changes are also made in the refunding of securities.
If a company has a good business rating, it may call in some
of its bonds and issue new bonds at a lower rate of interest.
Other corporations that are faced with immediate maturities
rather than facing bankruptcy, present their problems to their
security holders, and arrive at some equitable plan of reorg-
anization, such as so much cash and the balance partially in
coupon bunds and the remainder in income bonds.
MM^UFACTUHIITG CHANGES
The depression clears the business atmosphere of
many inefficient manufacturing organizations, merchandising
units, ajid financial houses. Business at the start of the new
recovery period must not compete with out-throat competition
nor distress selling. Orders are given and sales are made
without any of the previous disturbing factors.
Production instead of being way ahead of demand
has a tendency to lag and orders pile up on the books. Suoply
at last has been controlled and meets the demand for goods
rather than being unbalanced on the supply side of the equation.
Wages have been readjusted downward at various stages
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of the depression and are not at the low points In fact
one sign of recovery is the reinstatement of previous wage
reductions in certain industries.
Salaries and wages have also been readjusted along
more equitable lines and no one group seems to be bearing
the burden more than another, (Jreat numbers of unemployed
have also been given consideration. ^"The distribution of
the load is effected by giving partial employment to a larger
rather than full employment to a smaller number,"
Furthermore the greatest problem in business, name-
ly that of distribution, has been corrected in many resoects.
E
"The plain fact is that one of the great wastes of business
is due to the incredibly inefficient methods of distribution."
More complete and definite plans are made, duplications of
necessity have been eliminated, and joint and co-operative
facilities are made use of.
The changes in various phases of manufacturing as
a result of a depression help speed up the recovery period.
New products have also been devised and old products have
been improved so that the consumer reaps much of the benefit,
iioonomical Changes
The last depression probably brought forth a larger
crop of new economic theories than any other in our entire
history. More thought was given to economic planning, new
theories of governmental control, currency manipulation, and
1. Graham, jj'rank D. , THE ABOLITIOII OF UNE'TLOYT.!ENT. 1932, P.8E.
2. mene, Kdward A., THE WAY OUT, 1924, P,109.
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auch like than ever before. Socialism, Conmianism, and
Facism all seemed to be considered with renewed interest.
The elimination of the cities* slums and the sub-
stitution of modern, sanitary, well built model tenements was
another proposed idea. Also, the five-day week for all Amer-
ican business has been mentioned many times and has received
a measure of polite' consideration entirely inconsistent with
its merit, Mi^ny other ideas are also proposed, such as
Technocracy, Nationalism, iiedistribution , etc.
Out of every depression a few new worth while theories
are developed and finally used in actual business; the others
fall by the way side or present themselves in revised form
during the course of the next depression. There is no short-
cut and no easy way out of the depression period in spite of
the many proposed revolutionary theories.
NEW EVILS—EFFECT OF DEPRESSIOUS
The great difficulty of corrective measures when
used to rid the country of depression is in the new evils they
produce. Stimulants are given to certain depressed industries
to help them out, and then with this added help these indus-
tries start producing to excess.
The use of inflation many times has also caused
much trouble. The people from the depths of depression call
for currency inflation to help business. They get inflation
with the hope that in some mysterious manner it is supposed
to increase the wealth of the world and make them so much
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better off. nut are they satisfied? No, they demand more.
^"Did uncontrolled inflation of G;erinany inoreaae the v/ealth
of Germany? Far from iti It destroyed confidence oomnlete-
ly ; it destroyed credit completely; it took from the savings
of the people their last dollar."
Furthermc^re, by reason of the large profits that
are realized as a result of changes made, a great deal of
speculation and fraud is sure to occur, and these all tend
to intensify the disturbances of the time.
2
"-any proposed method for stabilizing business,
then, needs to be looked at in regard to all the follov:ing
points: (li Is it aimed in a desirable direction? (2) Is
it a self-canceling (i.e., bootstraps) proposition, or are
its effects cumulative? (3) How much correct general prophecy
does it require? (4) How much of the martyr spirit will it
take to stand by the wheel?"
Certain industries through legislation are conceded
undue advantages, and are therefore able to make unusually
large profits during the recovery period. This results in
unfair competition in other similar industries, and there-
fore the corrective measures vork both a benefit and a hard-
ship to business which may not be straightened out until the
succeeding period of depression. For example, in a recent
depression, the railroads were placed under the control of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and as such, were subject
to severe regulation; whereas the trucking and bus transpor-
1. Schweitzer, H. R. , 3ACKi:?ICE OH GHA03?, 1933, P. 36.
2. Coyle, David Cushman, BUSINESS VS. PIKAKCE, 1932, ?.14.
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tation business, even thoiigh doing interstate business, were
not hampered by any suoh regulatory oommission. They could
cut rates far belov; those of the railroads and thus through
unfair competition, make large profits. As yet, this situa-
tion has not been remedied, and may not be, until the next
depression,
RELIED IAL
Majay past attempts have been made either to control
business depressions or to eliminate them altogether. Such
efforts have usually been along three different lines, namely,
legislative measures, trade associatioi^s , and co-operative
agreements.
HISTOEICAL ATTEI^TS
The more important attempts in history have been of
a legislative nature. The i'ederal Reserve System was given
ostensible authority through the operation of the rediscount
rate, and through open market operations of purchasing and
selling government bonds. This system has proved to be very
important legislation and although during the Detression of
1930-33, this legislation T^•as operative, it did not result in
preventing the Depression. Other laws and authorities have
been given in the form of inflationary measures, stabilization
of the price level, banking reform, and security regulation.
Perhaps the most recent legislative atterat)! was
that of the government entering into business as a so-called
silent partner. This was done in the form of the National
Industrial Recovery ^ict which placed the more important in-
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dustries under codes which had the effect of regulating employ-
ment, wages, trade practises, and many other business functions.
The threat of this Act was sufficient to start v/hat might be
termed a substantial business recovery, and v.hen the law was
finally enacted, business continued this uoward momentum.
Other quite successful attempts have been made in
the form of trade associations. ^"The growth of the trade
association movement clearly indicates that it is an agency
which can adjust its program to meet the new and ever vary-
ing problems of business." The basis of the trade organiza-
tion is mutual aid. A large company may be in a position to
develop its own laboratories, and other facilities for keeping
the business up-to-date and in touch with the market. These
improvements, the smaller concern is unable to make, and its
only salvation lies in pooling its interests v.'ith those of
competing companies. Other functions carried on are the ooer-
ation of a traffic bureau, a legislative bureau, and trade in-
ventions. All of these enable, for example, one branch of in-
dustry to operate more efficiently, and thus prevent a more
drastic period of decline v.*hen the depression gets under way.
The trade association has been of great help in rounding off
many of the sharp corners encountered in a depression.
Co-operative agreement between industries also has
played an important part in many of the historical attempts
at fighting business depressions. One exaniple is that of the
1. Lover, John G^eorge, and Cornell, William, THE DEVELOPISITT
UP AMERICAN INDUSTRIES, 1932, P. 885.
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"share the work movement", in which industry agreed to employ
a greater number of people for a leaser number of hours eaoh
week rather than to give full time employment to only a por-
tion of the population. It is also important to mention the
oo-operation between the Labor Union and the employers. Co-
operative agreements between these two factors have also been
made and have resulted in preventing further serious difficul-
ties .
Co-operative advertising has also been atterapted with
pronounced results. Such advertising tends to increase the
sales in the specific industry, instructs the public in the
more effective use of the oroduct, and in the elimination of
certain trade abuses. Go-operation, therefore, has always been
of great assistance in helping the country out of severe busi-
ness difficulties.
FACTORS HELPING TO LESSEN SEVERITY
The possibility of stabilized prosperity is very re-
mote, and therefore, business must content itself with facing
future deT)ressions. Under existing conditions, periods of
prosperity alternate with periods of profound depression. Dur-
ing the former, the public loses all interest in the necessary
adjustments of the social and economic scheme to changing con-
ditions. During the latter period, there is a general tendency
to hysteiioal action which refuses consideration of all ration-
al solutions of important problems.
Since depressions are the inevitable, various methods
may be used to lessen their severity. These methods usually

take an^ one, or all, of the followiii,-^ forraa: legislation,
oo-operative agreements, controlled oompetition, controlled
inflation, supply and demand, taxation, and conservatism.
Each one is of no doubt of ejual importance, but perhaps more
definite results have been obtained by the use of the first
method, that of legislation.
The legislative efforts have usually been in the di-
rection of deflating business, as inflation carries the country
far above normal, and inflating business, as deflation, carries
business way belovv normal, 'x'he i'ederal Reserve System and its
member banks expanding v.hen needed, is also another method.
Legislation aimed at providing relief for distressed or ailing
industries including the farmers, also lessens the severity
of depressions. The regulation of the tariffs, unemployment,
unfair oompetition, and stabilization of currency also lessens
business decline.
Co-operative agreement •worked out through the aid of
trade association does much to stabilize production and dis-
tribution. Consolidations of both the vertical and horizontal
type of business enterprises often result in an eoonomio way
out of business difficulties.
Another factor is thcit of controlling comoetition,
80 as to eliminate unfair trade practises, distress selling,
and sales belo^^ cost. Such a practice does away with abnor-
mal speculation and over-production with the corresponding
offsetting of prices. However, on the other hand, great monop-
olies with uncontrolled discretion are also certainly dangerous.
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''""'j.he necessity for some method of making legal agreements
whioh oan stop senseless competition vjith its threat to the
stability of established industrial groups and its shocking
economic wastes is becoming more and more apparent."
Some form of controlled inflation may also be used
to eliminate partially the severity of depressions. This
factor gives an artificial stiramlant to prices and thus pro-
motes better sentiment, starts a demand for goods on account
of the threat of higher prices, and finally leads to an in-
crease of employment. This method, however, is likely to
prove disastrous if rigid control is not ezerted, or if infla-
tionary measures are undertaken too soon. Therefore, it is
wise to resort to inflation, only as a final attempt in lessen-
ing the severity of depressions. The regulation of supply and
demand is also an important factor, which will more or less
take care of itself, providing these other suggested plans
are used.
The form, amourit, and burden of taxation plays a
very important part in business activity. Business men v^ill
stand only a certain tax burden, after which they do not care
whether they make a profit or even stay in business. There-
fore when business starts a downward trend, a lessening of
the tax burden would be of great assistance in limiting the
severity. Taxation laws should be flexible, so that any sudden
change in any particular industry would also change the amount
of taxes to be paid by that industry. For example, one reason
for the backward condition of the utilities at the present
1. Donham, Wallace lirett, BUSIIIES^ ADRIPT* x931, P.144.
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time, when other indiistries seem to be forging ahead into
recovery, is the tremendous tax burden they must bear. A
relief from this extraordinary burden would immediately help
the utilities, and haye an aooumulative effect for the better
on all business.
Human nature always tenda to be speculative, and
seems to lack conservatism. When depression first sets in, ini-
mediate conservatism should be the vogue. This would mean no
further expansion of credit, restriction of overproduction, the
setting up by corporations of ample reserves, and the payment
of a majority of the debts, ^"increasing the nation's debt,
the issuing of fiat money, the building of non-productive pub-
lic works, the discharge of public and other employees, etc.,
are merely temporary palliatives— even if economically sound.
Prosperity returns only as more people are put back to work.
Hence, when the deflation has gone far enough, systematic
steps should be taken to quota back into industry the unem-
ployed." Conservatism instead of speculation should be the
watchword.
NEGATIVE FACTOHS
Many difficulties are encountered in attempts to
lessen the severity of depressions. These, of course, are all
of a negative nature, and tend to aggravate instead of stabil-
ize conditions. i?or the most part, they may be summarized as
follows: over-production, expansion of credit. Federal Re-
serve System, Security Exchanges, Social trends, hoarders, tax-
1. Babson. Hoger W., FIOHTIKG BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS. 1932, P. 245.
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ation, speoulation, and legislation.
The desire for increased profits alv.ays seems to
lead to over-production. This causes excessive inventories,
followed by price declines and subsequent distress selling.
iixpansion of credit juat at a time when there should
be a contraction of credit is another disturbing item. Busi-
ness men, when business first starts to decline, think that by
putting more money into their business, and thus enlarging it,
they will not be affected so severely. Therefore, it is this
unwarranted expansion of credit that adds to the difficulties
of business at such times.
The i'ederal Reserve System was formed as a result
of the Panic of 1907, and although its various methods have
done much to improve business, yet in many crucial places it
has failed to operate successfully. It was supposed to have
made bank suspensions practically impossible—witness the
3600 failures in 1920-31. Its legal reserves were created for
periods of possible liquidation, but they have been used as
a support for a large expansion in currency and credit. Thus,
the Reserve System has been a somewhat negative factor.
Speculation on the Security Exchanges has done much
to unsettle business in times past. The legitimate use of the
stock market is for the purpose of the investment of the sur-
plus funds of individusils, and not as a trading medium for
speculators. Speculators take out of the money market funds
which should be used for legitimate business. Another detri-
mental item is that of margin trading. This probably caused
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raore grief than any one factor, and. it also causes distress
liquidation, which unsettles the whole security market. Bus-
iness men would not suffer so great a depression if they wo'ild
devote their entire time to their own businesa rather than so
much time to stock market speculation.
Social trends must also be considered at times as a
negative factor'. "^"Anything which affects the emotions of
men must necessarily affect their ability to make decisions,
anticipate decisions, or postpone decisions. If these times
of postponed decisions or accelerated .judgments or stimulated
efforts are not isolated, but, on the contrary, run in wave-
like movements, we think that there may be something to the
suggestion that varying birth-rates and fluctuating death-
rates can and do affect business cycles."
There are two general types of hoarding, namely,
that by the banks and that by individuals. The banks hoard
when they refuse to grant credit for legitimate business pur-
poses. The public at large have hoarded by the use of actual
currency which naturgLlly decreases the purchasing ability and
the amount of possible credit since our credit system is based
on currency. Hoeprding, therefore, causes business decline.
Heavy income taxes on individuals reduce their pur-
chasing power greatly during times of deoression just when a
decrease in purchasing power has such a great effect on bus-
iness, ii^rt hermor e , on account of high taxes, investors buy
tax-exempt bonds instead of railroad, public utility, or indus-
1. Hexter, Maurice Beck, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 0^ BUSINESS
CYCLES, 1925, P. 174.
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trial bonds, thus robbing business of much needed new finano-
ing. Burdensome taxation must be considered as one of the
more important of the "negative factors.
Speculation- in commodities tends either to boost
artificially the price level, or to deflate nrices artific-
ially, xbe result is a bad effect on legitimate business, re-
sulting in manufacturers having to pay either unreasonably
high prices, or baigain prices for their raw material. In
times of business strain, this speculation does much to offset
any stabilizing influences.
Legislation may not always be of the helpful variety.
Two examples are worthy of mention in passing, namely, the
law creating the Interstate Commerce Commission, and legisla-
tion giving us the New Securities Act.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has placed un-
due restrictions esoecially on the railroads. The New Secur-
ities Act has caused a stagnation of new financing, thus slow-
ing up the process of business recovery.
'xhe entrance into production of the equipment indus-
tries also may cause difficulty especially if they start at
the wrong time. It is important that production of consumers'
goods is at a rather rapid rate before the heavy industries
go into production, or else an immediate overproduction of
heavy equipment will result; and with the large amount of cap-
ital and bank loans necessary for the heavy industries, this
would have the tendency to aggravate conditions at a precari-
ous time.
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'2he anticipation of possible control of deoressions
has the tendency to create nev. disturbing effects. If the
public begin to realize that future depressions will not be
so severe, and the likelihood of their suffering in the future
large losses is mostly eliminated, they will not out so much
money into life insurance. The adverse effect on this very
important business and its cumulative effect on general busi-
ness goes without further corainent.
Also, since the public •would naturally expect a
higher standard of living from this possible control of de-
pressions, and also a higher rate oi income, there will follow
an increase in the birth rate. This steady increase, in tir^e,
may eventually cause an increase in unemployment, another dis-
turbing factor.
There might also result a decrease in human effic-
iency, the elimination of hedging, and an increase in oroperty
ownership, which are all factors that change business conditions
and business trends.
CONCLUSIONS
V<ithout question past history has taught us that we
still face future business depressions. V^hetber these de-
pressions are international or national, whether financial or
mercantile, whether a psuiic or just a minor disturbance, de-
pends upon how we benefit by past experience.
This country has never failed to recover from a de-
pression, and each period of recovery and subsequent prosper-
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ity has been greater than any previous one. But, the law of
action and reaction always seems to viork, '^'he higher Tie go,
eventually, the lower we must go. Therefore, only as we pre-
vent or control future excesses will we be relieved of sub-
sequent panics and disasters. As v;e are now recovering from
the greatest depression in history, we must look to the future
rather than to the past.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to propound
some definite plan of eliminating depressions, but to point
out in our present economic and business system some of the
weaknesses which may be corrected with little effort.
In the first place we are possessed with an over-
abundance of debt. Statistics show clearly that the country
as set up today cannot stand the present increase in debt as it
is now accumulating under compound interest at its present rate.
Of course there are different methods of attacking this debt
problem: the laissez-faire method through reorganizations and
bankruptcies, which incidentally the public will not put up
with much longer; a rigid requirement providing for the opera-
tion of a sinking fund so that a certain amount of debt will be
retired each year from profits; retirement of fixed interest
debt and the refunding thru stock issues, depending of course
upon market conditions. Finally, this tremendous debt total
oould be reduced by inflation or by cheapening the money of the
country. This has the advantage of being painless in the final
stages. The sinking fund method is by fax the most practical,
reasonable, and conservative.
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In the second place we need a sta-jilized world
currency. jTiat moriei^ is entirely unnecessiry in attacking de-
pressions, as well as stimulated inflation. Inflation of the
natural variety will come in time, anyway, and does not need to
be forced-witness every one of our past depressions. With a
stabilized system, world trade can be carried on ;ithout fear
of sudden loss due to exchange rates fluctuating severely.
World trade is essential to good business, and any Dolicy of
nationalism is doomed only to failure. One nation cannot oros-
per in the Ion;? run unless other nations prosper.
Thirdly, our system of distribution is the most cost-
ly on record. Duplication of facilities exists on every hand.
We have a gasoline station on almost every block, chain grocery
stores four or five to a community, trains, trucks, busses,
ships, and airplanes continually rushing to the same points of
destination, and tov.n, county, state, and federal governments all
covering the same jurisdiction. This cost of distribution is
blocking production, increasing the cost of goods, and causing
much unemployment. Many claim that Droper control of distribu-
tion would reduce living costs 50 per cent and increase the
volume of sales to the advantage of all.
The fourth is aimed directly at the government. By
all means the credit of the government must be protected and
maintained. This can only be done by a gradual redaction in
the billions of dollars outstanding in bonds, the balancing of
the budget immediately, restriction of vast public building
programs, and a regime of econor^y.
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The banking system and the protection of the
people's savings is the' fifth consideration. Confidence in
our banks and our banking system is very essential for the
good of business, ihirthermor e, nev; funds for investment must
be protected by reasonable laws so that the public will not
suffer severe losses from the issuance and sale of securities.
Sixth, the exploitation of labor-saving machinery
must be on a co-operative schedule with the limitation placed
upon the hours of employment of labor so as to prevent unem-
ployment. This must be carried even further so as to spread
employment over the entire population and also to provide time
for education and the cultural side of life, ^^lrthermore
,
child labor should be abolished and adequate accident and health
insurance maintained for all employees.
Mnally, a redistribution of wealth is bound to come
and with it a greater state of equality for all. The masses
will have the buying power to provide in a decent measure for
their sustenance the products of their toil.
The development of the above factors will bring a
more uniform state of business, and when we are again faced
with a deoression, conditions can be attacked in such a manner
as to reduce the intensity, severity, and duration of business
inactivity. The working out of these efforts must of necessity
depend upon the human element which even at best is changeable.
We need more effective and rationally foresighted leadership
culminating in philosophically sound planning. Our ai:-. should
be to foster such a degree of steadiness in our business growth
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eind improvement, and suoh standards of wisdom and honesty as
will reduce the effeots of depressions to a minimum.
This, one thin'g is clearly demonstrated, thett from
vihcitever cause or causes depressions arise, they hare alv.ays
proved but temporary. It does not take long to forget the
tragic experiences which they record, especially when business
is reaching new high grounds of prosperity not oreviotisly
attained.
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